identity: dynamic client registration (RFC 7591, +5 tests)

register_dynamic generates a client_id + secret server-side and registers
the client, returning {ok, ClientId, Secret} — self-service onboarding
distinct from the manual register_client. A dynamic confidential client can
then use client_credentials; a dynamic public client stays
unauthorized_client. New tests/dynreg.sx. 222/222.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

lib/identity/audit.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+;; identity/audit.sx — the grant audit ledger.
+;;
+;; Every transition that changes a grant — issue, refresh, revoke (and,
+;; wired from oauth, consent) — appends an immutable event to this
+;; append-only process. The ledger is queryable by subject, which is what
+;; `(identity/audit subject)` answers. This is the in-memory realisation
+;; of the event stream; a persist-backed stream is a later substrate
+;; concern (Erlang↔persist bridge), kept out of scope here per the loop's
+;; \"in-memory log until persist lands\" allowance — the queryable
+;; semantics are identical.
+;;
+;; Events are {Seq, Subject, Action}; Seq is a monotonic sequence number.
+;; Reads return chronological (oldest-first) order:
+;;
+;;   record(A, Subject, Action)  -> ok       (one-way; FIFO-ordered)
+;;   audit(A, Subject)           -> [{Seq, Subject, Action}, ...]
+;;   actions(A, Subject)         -> [Action, ...]
+;;   count(A, Subject)           -> N
+;;   all(A)                      -> [{Seq, Subject, Action}, ...]
+
+(define
+  identity-audit-source
+  "-module(identity_audit).\n\n   start() ->\n     spawn(fun () -> loop([], 0) end).\n\n   record(A, Subject, Action) ->\n     A ! {event, Subject, Action},\n     ok.\n\n   audit(A, Subject) ->\n     A ! {audit, Subject, self()},\n     receive {audit_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   actions(A, Subject) ->\n     A ! {actions, Subject, self()},\n     receive {audit_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   count(A, Subject) ->\n     A ! {count, Subject, self()},\n     receive {audit_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   all(A) ->\n     A ! {all, self()},\n     receive {audit_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   loop(Events, Seq) ->\n     receive\n       {event, Subject, Action} ->\n         loop([{Seq, Subject, Action} | Events], Seq + 1);\n       {audit, Subject, From} ->\n         From ! {audit_reply, collect(Subject, Events, [])},\n         loop(Events, Seq);\n       {actions, Subject, From} ->\n         From ! {audit_reply, action_list(Subject, Events, [])},\n         loop(Events, Seq);\n       {count, Subject, From} ->\n         From ! {audit_reply, count_subj(Subject, Events, 0)},\n         loop(Events, Seq);\n       {all, From} ->\n         From ! {audit_reply, reverse(Events, [])},\n         loop(Events, Seq);\n       {stop, From} ->\n         From ! {audit_reply, ok}\n     end.\n\n   collect(_, [], Acc) -> Acc;\n   collect(Subject, [{Seq, S, A} | Rest], Acc) ->\n     case S =:= Subject of\n       true -> collect(Subject, Rest, [{Seq, S, A} | Acc]);\n       false -> collect(Subject, Rest, Acc)\n     end.\n\n   action_list(_, [], Acc) -> Acc;\n   action_list(Subject, [{_, S, A} | Rest], Acc) ->\n     case S =:= Subject of\n       true -> action_list(Subject, Rest, [A | Acc]);\n       false -> action_list(Subject, Rest, Acc)\n     end.\n\n   count_subj(_, [], N) -> N;\n   count_subj(Subject, [{_, S, _} | Rest], N) ->\n     case S =:= Subject of\n       true -> count_subj(Subject, Rest, N + 1);\n       false -> count_subj(Subject, Rest, N)\n     end.\n\n   reverse([], Acc) -> Acc;\n   reverse([H | T], Acc) -> reverse(T, [H | Acc]).")
+
+(define
+  identity-load-audit!
+  (fn () (erlang-load-module identity-audit-source)))

lib/identity/cache.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+;; identity/cache.sx — a delegated grant-verification cache, mirroring the
+;; Redis-cache pattern apps use in front of grant verification.
+;;
+;; The cache is a process wrapping a token registry. introspect() is
+;; memoised; issue/issue_grant/refresh/revoke pass through. The danger
+;; with any cache is staleness: a revoked token must NOT keep reading
+;; valid out of the cache, not even for a millisecond (the loop's hard
+;; rule). We get that for free with GENERATION invalidation:
+;;
+;;   - each cache entry records the generation it was written at;
+;;   - a hit requires entry.generation == current generation;
+;;   - any state-changing op that can invalidate an existing token
+;;     (revoke — which cascades to a grant; refresh — whose reuse cascades)
+;;     bumps the generation.
+;;
+;; So a single revoke instantly invalidates every cached positive: the
+;; next introspect is a miss and re-validates against the live registry,
+;; which returns {inactive}. Revocation stays real; the cache only ever
+;; accelerates the steady state, never overrides a revocation.
+;;
+;; stats() -> {Hits, Misses} so callers can see the cache is live.
+
+(define
+  identity-cache-source
+  "-module(identity_grant_cache).\n\n   start() ->\n     spawn(fun () ->\n       Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       loop(Reg, 1, [], 0, 0)\n     end).\n\n   issue(C, Subject, Client, Scope) ->\n     C ! {issue, Subject, Client, Scope, self()},\n     receive {cache_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   issue_grant(C, Subject, Client, Scope) ->\n     C ! {issue_grant, Subject, Client, Scope, self()},\n     receive {cache_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   refresh(C, RefreshTok) ->\n     C ! {refresh, RefreshTok, self()},\n     receive {cache_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   introspect(C, Token) ->\n     C ! {introspect, Token, self()},\n     receive {cache_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   revoke(C, Token) ->\n     C ! {revoke, Token, self()},\n     receive {cache_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   stats(C) ->\n     C ! {stats, self()},\n     receive {cache_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   loop(Reg, Gen, Entries, Hits, Misses) ->\n     receive\n       {introspect, Tok, From} ->\n         case lookup_fresh(Tok, Gen, Entries) of\n           {hit, Result} ->\n             From ! {cache_reply, Result},\n             loop(Reg, Gen, Entries, Hits + 1, Misses);\n           miss ->\n             Result = identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, Tok),\n             From ! {cache_reply, Result},\n             loop(Reg, Gen, put_entry(Tok, Result, Gen, Entries), Hits, Misses + 1)\n         end;\n       {issue, Subject, Client, Scope, From} ->\n         From ! {cache_reply, identity_tokens:issue(Reg, Subject, Client, Scope)},\n         loop(Reg, Gen, Entries, Hits, Misses);\n       {issue_grant, Subject, Client, Scope, From} ->\n         From ! {cache_reply, identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, Subject, Client, Scope)},\n         loop(Reg, Gen, Entries, Hits, Misses);\n       {refresh, RTok, From} ->\n         From ! {cache_reply, identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, RTok)},\n         loop(Reg, Gen + 1, Entries, Hits, Misses);\n       {revoke, Tok, From} ->\n         identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, Tok),\n         From ! {cache_reply, ok},\n         loop(Reg, Gen + 1, Entries, Hits, Misses);\n       {stats, From} ->\n         From ! {cache_reply, {Hits, Misses}},\n         loop(Reg, Gen, Entries, Hits, Misses)\n     end.\n\n   lookup_fresh(_, _, []) -> miss;\n   lookup_fresh(Tok, Gen, [{T, {Result, G}} | Rest]) ->\n     case T =:= Tok of\n       true ->\n         case G =:= Gen of\n           true -> {hit, Result};\n           false -> miss\n         end;\n       false -> lookup_fresh(Tok, Gen, Rest)\n     end.\n\n   put_entry(Tok, Result, Gen, Entries) ->\n     [{Tok, {Result, Gen}} | remove(Tok, Entries)].\n\n   remove(_, []) -> [];\n   remove(Tok, [{T, V} | Rest]) ->\n     case T =:= Tok of\n       true -> remove(Tok, Rest);\n       false -> [{T, V} | remove(Tok, Rest)]\n     end.")
+
+(define
+  identity-load-cache!
+  (fn () (erlang-load-module identity-cache-source)))

lib/identity/clients.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+;; identity/clients.sx — the OAuth client registry (RFC 6749 §2).
+;;
+;; A client is registered with a type, a secret, and its allow-listed
+;; redirect_uris:
+;;
+;;   public        — cannot keep a secret (SPAs, native apps, §2.1);
+;;                   identified but not authenticated.
+;;   confidential  — can authenticate; MUST present its secret at the token
+;;                   endpoint (§3.2.1, §4.1.3). A wrong secret is
+;;                   invalid_client — never a soft pass.
+;;
+;; Redirect URIs must be pre-registered (§3.1.2.2 + OAuth Security BCP):
+;; valid_redirect/3 is the exact-match check the authorize/exchange steps
+;; consult so an attacker cannot redirect the code to an unregistered URI.
+;;
+;;   register(C, ClientId, Type, Secret, RedirectUris) -> ok | {error, exists}
+;;   lookup(C, ClientId)            -> {ok, Type, RedirectUris} | {error, unknown_client}
+;;   authenticate(C, ClientId, Sec) -> {ok, public} | {ok, confidential}
+;;                                   | {error, invalid_client} | {error, unknown_client}
+;;   valid_redirect(C, ClientId, U) -> true | false
+
+(define
+  identity-clients-source
+  "-module(identity_clients).\n\n   start() ->\n     spawn(fun () -> loop([]) end).\n\n   register(C, ClientId, Type, Secret, RedirectUris) ->\n     C ! {register, ClientId, Type, Secret, RedirectUris, self()},\n     receive {client_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   lookup(C, ClientId) ->\n     C ! {lookup, ClientId, self()},\n     receive {client_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   authenticate(C, ClientId, Secret) ->\n     C ! {authenticate, ClientId, Secret, self()},\n     receive {client_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   valid_redirect(C, ClientId, Uri) ->\n     C ! {valid_redirect, ClientId, Uri, self()},\n     receive {client_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   loop(Clients) ->\n     receive\n       {register, ClientId, Type, Secret, RedirectUris, From} ->\n         case find(ClientId, Clients) of\n           {ok, _} ->\n             From ! {client_reply, {error, exists}},\n             loop(Clients);\n           none ->\n             From ! {client_reply, ok},\n             loop([{ClientId, {Type, Secret, RedirectUris}} | Clients])\n         end;\n       {lookup, ClientId, From} ->\n         case find(ClientId, Clients) of\n           none -> From ! {client_reply, {error, unknown_client}};\n           {ok, {Type, _, Uris}} -> From ! {client_reply, {ok, Type, Uris}}\n         end,\n         loop(Clients);\n       {authenticate, ClientId, Secret, From} ->\n         case find(ClientId, Clients) of\n           none ->\n             From ! {client_reply, {error, unknown_client}};\n           {ok, {public, _, _}} ->\n             From ! {client_reply, {ok, public}};\n           {ok, {confidential, S, _}} ->\n             case S =:= Secret of\n               true -> From ! {client_reply, {ok, confidential}};\n               false -> From ! {client_reply, {error, invalid_client}}\n             end\n         end,\n         loop(Clients);\n       {valid_redirect, ClientId, Uri, From} ->\n         case find(ClientId, Clients) of\n           none -> From ! {client_reply, false};\n           {ok, {_, _, Uris}} -> From ! {client_reply, member(Uri, Uris)}\n         end,\n         loop(Clients);\n       {stop, From} ->\n         From ! {client_reply, ok}\n     end.\n\n   member(_, []) -> false;\n   member(X, [Y | Rest]) ->\n     case X =:= Y of\n       true -> true;\n       false -> member(X, Rest)\n     end.\n\n   find(_, []) -> none;\n   find(Key, [{K, V} | Rest]) ->\n     case K =:= Key of\n       true -> {ok, V};\n       false -> find(Key, Rest)\n     end.")
+
+(define
+  identity-load-clients!
+  (fn () (erlang-load-module identity-clients-source)))

lib/identity/conformance.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# identity-on-sx conformance runner.
+#
+# Loads the Erlang-on-SX substrate, the identity library, and every
+# identity test suite via the epoch protocol, collects pass/fail counts,
+# and writes lib/identity/scoreboard.json + .md.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   bash lib/identity/conformance.sh        # run all suites
+#   bash lib/identity/conformance.sh -v     # verbose per-suite
+
+set -uo pipefail
+cd "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
+
+SX_SERVER="${SX_SERVER:-hosts/ocaml/_build/default/bin/sx_server.exe}"
+if [ ! -x "$SX_SERVER" ]; then
+  SX_SERVER="/root/rose-ash/hosts/ocaml/_build/default/bin/sx_server.exe"
+fi
+if [ ! -x "$SX_SERVER" ]; then
+  echo "ERROR: sx_server.exe not found." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+VERBOSE="${1:-}"
+TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
+OUTFILE=$(mktemp)
+trap "rm -f $TMPFILE $OUTFILE" EXIT
+
+# Each suite: name | counter pass | counter total
+SUITES=(
+  "session|id-session-test-pass|id-session-test-count"
+  "token|id-token-test-pass|id-token-test-count"
+  "registry|id-registry-test-pass|id-registry-test-count"
+  "api|id-api-test-pass|id-api-test-count"
+  "oauth|id-oauth-test-pass|id-oauth-test-count"
+  "sso|id-sso-test-pass|id-sso-test-count"
+  "membership|id-membership-test-pass|id-membership-test-count"
+  "cache|id-cache-test-pass|id-cache-test-count"
+  "audit|id-audit-test-pass|id-audit-test-count"
+  "federation|id-fed-test-pass|id-fed-test-count"
+  "expiry|id-expiry-test-pass|id-expiry-test-count"
+  "clients|id-clients-test-pass|id-clients-test-count"
+  "grants|id-grants-test-pass|id-grants-test-count"
+  "device|id-device-test-pass|id-device-test-count"
+  "facade|id-facade-test-pass|id-facade-test-count"
+  "delegation|id-deleg-test-pass|id-deleg-test-count"
+  "session-mgmt|id-smgmt-test-pass|id-smgmt-test-count"
+  "exchange|id-xchg-test-pass|id-xchg-test-count"
+  "introspect|id-intr-test-pass|id-intr-test-count"
+  "par|id-par-test-pass|id-par-test-count"
+  "dynreg|id-dyn-test-pass|id-dyn-test-count"
+)
+
+cat > "$TMPFILE" << 'EPOCHS'
+(epoch 1)
+(load "lib/erlang/tokenizer.sx")
+(load "lib/erlang/parser.sx")
+(load "lib/erlang/parser-core.sx")
+(load "lib/erlang/parser-expr.sx")
+(load "lib/erlang/parser-module.sx")
+(load "lib/erlang/transpile.sx")
+(load "lib/erlang/runtime.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/session.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/token.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/registry.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/api.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/oauth.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/membership.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/cache.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/audit.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/federation.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/clients.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/device.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/delegation.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/session.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/token.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/registry.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/api.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/oauth.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/sso.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/membership.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/cache.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/audit.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/federation.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/expiry.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/clients.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/grants.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/device.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/facade.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/delegation.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/session_mgmt.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/exchange.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/introspect.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/par.sx")
+(load "lib/identity/tests/dynreg.sx")
+(epoch 100)
+(eval "(list id-session-test-pass id-session-test-count)")
+(epoch 101)
+(eval "(list id-token-test-pass id-token-test-count)")
+(epoch 102)
+(eval "(list id-registry-test-pass id-registry-test-count)")
+(epoch 103)
+(eval "(list id-api-test-pass id-api-test-count)")
+(epoch 104)
+(eval "(list id-oauth-test-pass id-oauth-test-count)")
+(epoch 105)
+(eval "(list id-sso-test-pass id-sso-test-count)")
+(epoch 106)
+(eval "(list id-membership-test-pass id-membership-test-count)")
+(epoch 107)
+(eval "(list id-cache-test-pass id-cache-test-count)")
+(epoch 108)
+(eval "(list id-audit-test-pass id-audit-test-count)")
+(epoch 109)
+(eval "(list id-fed-test-pass id-fed-test-count)")
+(epoch 110)
+(eval "(list id-expiry-test-pass id-expiry-test-count)")
+(epoch 111)
+(eval "(list id-clients-test-pass id-clients-test-count)")
+(epoch 112)
+(eval "(list id-grants-test-pass id-grants-test-count)")
+(epoch 113)
+(eval "(list id-device-test-pass id-device-test-count)")
+(epoch 114)
+(eval "(list id-facade-test-pass id-facade-test-count)")
+(epoch 115)
+(eval "(list id-deleg-test-pass id-deleg-test-count)")
+(epoch 116)
+(eval "(list id-smgmt-test-pass id-smgmt-test-count)")
+(epoch 117)
+(eval "(list id-xchg-test-pass id-xchg-test-count)")
+(epoch 118)
+(eval "(list id-intr-test-pass id-intr-test-count)")
+(epoch 119)
+(eval "(list id-par-test-pass id-par-test-count)")
+(epoch 120)
+(eval "(list id-dyn-test-pass id-dyn-test-count)")
+EPOCHS
+
+timeout 600 "$SX_SERVER" < "$TMPFILE" > "$OUTFILE" 2>&1
+
+parse_pair() {
+  local epoch="$1"
+  local line
+  line=$(grep -A1 "^(ok-len $epoch " "$OUTFILE" | tail -1)
+  echo "$line" | sed -E 's/[()]//g'
+}
+
+TOTAL_PASS=0
+TOTAL_COUNT=0
+JSON_SUITES=""
+MD_ROWS=""
+
+idx=0
+for entry in "${SUITES[@]}"; do
+  name="${entry%%|*}"
+  epoch=$((100 + idx))
+  pair=$(parse_pair "$epoch")
+  pass=$(echo "$pair" | awk '{print $1}')
+  count=$(echo "$pair" | awk '{print $2}')
+  if [ -z "$pass" ] || [ -z "$count" ]; then
+    pass=0
+    count=0
+  fi
+  TOTAL_PASS=$((TOTAL_PASS + pass))
+  TOTAL_COUNT=$((TOTAL_COUNT + count))
+  status="ok"
+  marker="✅"
+  if [ "$pass" != "$count" ]; then
+    status="fail"
+    marker="❌"
+  fi
+  if [ "$VERBOSE" = "-v" ]; then
+    printf "  %-12s %s/%s\n" "$name" "$pass" "$count"
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$JSON_SUITES" ]; then JSON_SUITES+=","; fi
+  JSON_SUITES+=$'\n    '
+  JSON_SUITES+="{\"name\":\"$name\",\"pass\":$pass,\"total\":$count,\"status\":\"$status\"}"
+  MD_ROWS+="| $marker | $name | $pass | $count |"$'\n'
+  idx=$((idx + 1))
+done
+
+printf '\nidentity-on-sx conformance: %d / %d\n' "$TOTAL_PASS" "$TOTAL_COUNT"
+
+cat > lib/identity/scoreboard.json <<JSON
+{
+  "language": "identity",
+  "total_pass": $TOTAL_PASS,
+  "total": $TOTAL_COUNT,
+  "suites": [$JSON_SUITES
+  ]
+}
+JSON
+
+cat > lib/identity/scoreboard.md <<MD
+# identity-on-sx Scoreboard
+
+**Total: ${TOTAL_PASS} / ${TOTAL_COUNT} tests passing**
+
+|  | Suite | Pass | Total |
+|---|---|---|---|
+$MD_ROWS
+
+Generated by \`lib/identity/conformance.sh\`.
+MD
+
+if [ "$TOTAL_PASS" -eq "$TOTAL_COUNT" ]; then
+  exit 0
+else
+  exit 1
+fi

lib/identity/delegation.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+;; identity/delegation.sx — the identity -> acl delegation boundary.
+;;
+;; This is the loop's central architectural rule made concrete:
+;; AUTHENTICATION is identity's job; AUTHORIZATION is acl's. A request is
+;; checked in two stages, and the order matters:
+;;
+;;   1. identity proves WHO via the opaque token (introspect). If the token
+;;      is inactive, the answer is {error, unauthenticated} — a 401. acl is
+;;      NEVER consulted; \"I don't know who you are\" is not a permission
+;;      question.
+;;   2. only for an authenticated subject does identity construct the
+;;      permission query {Subject, Scope, Action, Resource} and HAND IT OFF
+;;      to acl. acl returns permit | deny; deny is {error, forbidden} — a
+;;      403. identity itself never decides permission.
+;;
+;; The real decider is acl-on-sx (Datalog), which runs as a different
+;; guest language on SX and is wired in at the integration layer. Here the
+;; acl side is a labelled STUB process so the boundary is exercised: it
+;; permits when the Action is within the token's granted Scope. Swap the
+;; stub pid for the acl adapter and the boundary is unchanged.
+;;
+;;   check(TokReg, Acl, Token, Action, Resource) ->
+;;     {ok, Subject} | {error, unauthenticated} | {error, forbidden}
+
+(define
+  identity-delegation-source
+  "-module(identity_delegation).\n\n   check(TokReg, Acl, Token, Action, Resource) ->\n     case identity_tokens:introspect(TokReg, Token) of\n       {inactive} ->\n         {error, unauthenticated};\n       {active, Subject, _Client, Scope} ->\n         Acl ! {acl_query, Subject, Scope, Action, Resource, self()},\n         receive {acl_verdict, V} ->\n           case V of\n             permit -> {ok, Subject};\n             deny -> {error, forbidden}\n           end\n         end\n     end.\n\n   %% --- stub acl decider (stands in for acl-on-sx / Datalog) ---\n   %% Permits iff the Action is one of the token's granted scopes. The real\n   %% acl decides on rules + facts; this only exercises the handoff shape.\n   stub_acl() ->\n     spawn(fun () -> acl_loop() end).\n\n   acl_loop() ->\n     receive\n       {acl_query, _Subject, Scope, Action, _Resource, From} ->\n         From ! {acl_verdict, decide(Action, Scope)},\n         acl_loop();\n       stop ->\n         ok\n     end.\n\n   decide(Action, Scope) ->\n     case member(Action, Scope) of\n       true -> permit;\n       false -> deny\n     end.\n\n   member(_, []) -> false;\n   member(X, [Y | Rest]) ->\n     case X =:= Y of\n       true -> true;\n       false -> member(X, Rest)\n     end.")
+
+(define
+  identity-load-delegation!
+  (fn
+    ()
+    (identity-load-token!)
+    (erlang-load-module identity-delegation-source)))

lib/identity/device.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+;; identity/device.sx — the device authorization grant (RFC 8628).
+;;
+;; For input-constrained devices (TVs, CLIs): the device gets a device_code
+;; + user_code, the user approves out-of-band on another device, and the
+;; device polls the token endpoint until it flips. The poll status machine
+;; is RFC 8628 §3.5:
+;;
+;;   authorize(ClientId, Scope) -> {ok, DeviceCode, UserCode}
+;;   approve(UserCode, Subject) -> ok | {error, ...}   (the human's browser)
+;;   deny(UserCode)             -> ok | {error, ...}
+;;   poll(DeviceCode) ->
+;;     pending  -> {error, authorization_pending}
+;;     denied   -> {error, access_denied}
+;;     approved -> {ok, Token}        (device code is then single-use)
+;;     consumed -> {error, invalid_grant}
+;;     unknown  -> {error, invalid_grant}
+;;
+;; Tokens are grant-backed (token.sx) so revocation stays real. Device-code
+;; expiry and slow_down (poll-rate limiting) are deferred — the substrate
+;; has no wall clock and the core status machine is the security-relevant
+;; part; introspect via token.sx already honours token TTL.
+;;
+;; State: loop(TokReg, Requests) where Requests is
+;;   [{DeviceCode, UserCode, ClientId, Scope, Status}]
+;;   Status :: pending | {approved, Subject} | denied | consumed
+
+(define
+  identity-device-source
+  "-module(identity_device).\n\n   start() ->\n     spawn(fun () ->\n       TokReg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       loop(TokReg, [])\n     end).\n\n   authorize(D, ClientId, Scope) ->\n     D ! {authorize, ClientId, Scope, self()},\n     receive {device_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   approve(D, UserCode, Subject) ->\n     D ! {approve, UserCode, Subject, self()},\n     receive {device_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   deny(D, UserCode) ->\n     D ! {deny, UserCode, self()},\n     receive {device_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   poll(D, DeviceCode) ->\n     D ! {poll, DeviceCode, self()},\n     receive {device_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   introspect(D, Token) ->\n     D ! {introspect, Token, self()},\n     receive {device_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   loop(TokReg, Requests) ->\n     receive\n       {authorize, ClientId, Scope, From} ->\n         DeviceCode = make_ref(),\n         UserCode = make_ref(),\n         From ! {device_reply, {ok, DeviceCode, UserCode}},\n         loop(TokReg, [{DeviceCode, UserCode, ClientId, Scope, pending} | Requests]);\n       {approve, UserCode, Subject, From} ->\n         case find_user(UserCode, Requests) of\n           none ->\n             From ! {device_reply, {error, unknown_code}},\n             loop(TokReg, Requests);\n           {ok, {_, _, _, _, pending}} ->\n             From ! {device_reply, ok},\n             loop(TokReg, set_user(UserCode, {approved, Subject}, Requests));\n           {ok, {_, _, _, _, St}} ->\n             From ! {device_reply, {error, St}},\n             loop(TokReg, Requests)\n         end;\n       {deny, UserCode, From} ->\n         case find_user(UserCode, Requests) of\n           none ->\n             From ! {device_reply, {error, unknown_code}},\n             loop(TokReg, Requests);\n           {ok, {_, _, _, _, pending}} ->\n             From ! {device_reply, ok},\n             loop(TokReg, set_user(UserCode, denied, Requests));\n           {ok, {_, _, _, _, St}} ->\n             From ! {device_reply, {error, St}},\n             loop(TokReg, Requests)\n         end;\n       {poll, DeviceCode, From} ->\n         case find_device(DeviceCode, Requests) of\n           none ->\n             From ! {device_reply, {error, invalid_grant}},\n             loop(TokReg, Requests);\n           {ok, {_, _, _, _, pending}} ->\n             From ! {device_reply, {error, authorization_pending}},\n             loop(TokReg, Requests);\n           {ok, {_, _, _, _, denied}} ->\n             From ! {device_reply, {error, access_denied}},\n             loop(TokReg, Requests);\n           {ok, {_, _, _, _, consumed}} ->\n             From ! {device_reply, {error, invalid_grant}},\n             loop(TokReg, Requests);\n           {ok, {_, _, ClientId, Scope, {approved, Subject}}} ->\n             {ok, Token} = identity_tokens:issue(TokReg, Subject, ClientId, Scope),\n             From ! {device_reply, {ok, Token}},\n             loop(TokReg, set_device(DeviceCode, consumed, Requests))\n         end;\n       {introspect, Token, From} ->\n         From ! {device_reply, identity_tokens:introspect(TokReg, Token)},\n         loop(TokReg, Requests);\n       {stop, From} ->\n         From ! {device_reply, ok}\n     end.\n\n   find_device(_, []) -> none;\n   find_device(DCode, [{D, U, C, S, St} | Rest]) ->\n     case D =:= DCode of\n       true -> {ok, {D, U, C, S, St}};\n       false -> find_device(DCode, Rest)\n     end.\n\n   find_user(_, []) -> none;\n   find_user(UCode, [{D, U, C, S, St} | Rest]) ->\n     case U =:= UCode of\n       true -> {ok, {D, U, C, S, St}};\n       false -> find_user(UCode, Rest)\n     end.\n\n   set_device(_, _, []) -> [];\n   set_device(DCode, NewSt, [{D, U, C, S, St} | Rest]) ->\n     case D =:= DCode of\n       true -> [{D, U, C, S, NewSt} | Rest];\n       false -> [{D, U, C, S, St} | set_device(DCode, NewSt, Rest)]\n     end.\n\n   set_user(_, _, []) -> [];\n   set_user(UCode, NewSt, [{D, U, C, S, St} | Rest]) ->\n     case U =:= UCode of\n       true -> [{D, U, C, S, NewSt} | Rest];\n       false -> [{D, U, C, S, St} | set_user(UCode, NewSt, Rest)]\n     end.")
+
+(define
+  identity-load-device!
+  (fn () (identity-load-token!) (erlang-load-module identity-device-source)))

lib/identity/federation.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+;; identity/federation.sx — federated identity: peer-asserted subjects,
+;; advisory and trust-gated.
+;;
+;; A peer instance can assert \"this remote subject authenticated with me\".
+;; We accept such an assertion ONLY from a peer we explicitly trust
+;; (trust-gated); an assertion from an unknown peer is {error, untrusted},
+;; never silently honoured. Even when accepted, the resulting identity is
+;; ADVISORY: it is flagged peer_asserted with its origin peer, never
+;; promoted to local authority. Downstream (acl) decides how much a
+;; peer-asserted identity may do; identity only records who asserted it.
+;;
+;; Cross-instance subject mapping turns a (Peer, RemoteSubject) pair into a
+;; stable local subject. By default it is namespaced — {federated, Peer,
+;; RemoteSubject} — so two peers' \"alice\" never collide; an explicit map
+;; can alias a remote subject to a local one.
+;;
+;;   trust(F, Peer) / untrust(F, Peer) / trusted(F, Peer)
+;;   map(F, Peer, Remote, Local)            -> ok    (optional alias)
+;;   resolve(F, Peer, Remote)               -> {ok, LocalSubject}
+;;   assert_id(F, Peer, Remote)             -> {ok, LocalSubject}
+;;                                           | {error, untrusted}
+;;   provenance(F, LocalSubject)            -> {peer_asserted, Peer} | {local}
+
+(define
+  identity-federation-source
+  "-module(identity_federation).\n\n   start() ->\n     spawn(fun () -> loop([], [], []) end).\n\n   trust(F, Peer) ->\n     F ! {trust, Peer, self()},\n     receive {fed_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   untrust(F, Peer) ->\n     F ! {untrust, Peer, self()},\n     receive {fed_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   trusted(F, Peer) ->\n     F ! {trusted, Peer, self()},\n     receive {fed_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   map(F, Peer, Remote, Local) ->\n     F ! {map, Peer, Remote, Local, self()},\n     receive {fed_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   resolve(F, Peer, Remote) ->\n     F ! {resolve, Peer, Remote, self()},\n     receive {fed_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   assert_id(F, Peer, Remote) ->\n     F ! {assert_id, Peer, Remote, self()},\n     receive {fed_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   provenance(F, Local) ->\n     F ! {provenance, Local, self()},\n     receive {fed_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   loop(Trusted, Maps, Asserted) ->\n     receive\n       {trust, Peer, From} ->\n         From ! {fed_reply, ok},\n         loop(add_unique(Peer, Trusted), Maps, Asserted);\n       {untrust, Peer, From} ->\n         From ! {fed_reply, ok},\n         loop(drop(Peer, Trusted), Maps, Asserted);\n       {trusted, Peer, From} ->\n         From ! {fed_reply, member(Peer, Trusted)},\n         loop(Trusted, Maps, Asserted);\n       {map, Peer, Remote, Local, From} ->\n         From ! {fed_reply, ok},\n         loop(Trusted, [{{Peer, Remote}, Local} | drop_map(Peer, Remote, Maps)], Asserted);\n       {resolve, Peer, Remote, From} ->\n         From ! {fed_reply, {ok, resolve_local(Peer, Remote, Maps)}},\n         loop(Trusted, Maps, Asserted);\n       {assert_id, Peer, Remote, From} ->\n         case member(Peer, Trusted) of\n           false ->\n             From ! {fed_reply, {error, untrusted}},\n             loop(Trusted, Maps, Asserted);\n           true ->\n             Local = resolve_local(Peer, Remote, Maps),\n             From ! {fed_reply, {ok, Local}},\n             loop(Trusted, Maps, [{Local, Peer} | drop_assert(Local, Asserted)])\n         end;\n       {provenance, Local, From} ->\n         case find_assert(Local, Asserted) of\n           {ok, Peer} -> From ! {fed_reply, {peer_asserted, Peer}};\n           none -> From ! {fed_reply, {local}}\n         end,\n         loop(Trusted, Maps, Asserted);\n       {stop, From} ->\n         From ! {fed_reply, ok}\n     end.\n\n   resolve_local(Peer, Remote, Maps) ->\n     case find_map(Peer, Remote, Maps) of\n       {ok, Local} -> Local;\n       none -> {federated, Peer, Remote}\n     end.\n\n   find_map(_, _, []) -> none;\n   find_map(Peer, Remote, [{{P, R}, Local} | Rest]) ->\n     case same(P, Peer, R, Remote) of\n       true -> {ok, Local};\n       false -> find_map(Peer, Remote, Rest)\n     end.\n\n   drop_map(_, _, []) -> [];\n   drop_map(Peer, Remote, [{{P, R}, Local} | Rest]) ->\n     case same(P, Peer, R, Remote) of\n       true -> drop_map(Peer, Remote, Rest);\n       false -> [{{P, R}, Local} | drop_map(Peer, Remote, Rest)]\n     end.\n\n   same(P, Peer, R, Remote) ->\n     case P =:= Peer of\n       true -> R =:= Remote;\n       false -> false\n     end.\n\n   find_assert(_, []) -> none;\n   find_assert(Local, [{L, Peer} | Rest]) ->\n     case L =:= Local of\n       true -> {ok, Peer};\n       false -> find_assert(Local, Rest)\n     end.\n\n   drop_assert(_, []) -> [];\n   drop_assert(Local, [{L, Peer} | Rest]) ->\n     case L =:= Local of\n       true -> drop_assert(Local, Rest);\n       false -> [{L, Peer} | drop_assert(Local, Rest)]\n     end.\n\n   add_unique(X, Xs) ->\n     case member(X, Xs) of\n       true -> Xs;\n       false -> [X | Xs]\n     end.\n\n   drop(_, []) -> [];\n   drop(X, [Y | Rest]) ->\n     case X =:= Y of\n       true -> drop(X, Rest);\n       false -> [Y | drop(X, Rest)]\n     end.\n\n   member(_, []) -> false;\n   member(X, [Y | Rest]) ->\n     case X =:= Y of\n       true -> true;\n       false -> member(X, Rest)\n     end.")
+
+(define
+  identity-load-federation!
+  (fn () (erlang-load-module identity-federation-source)))

lib/identity/membership.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+;; identity/membership.sx — coop membership state + per-app projection.
+;;
+;; Membership is canonical subject state held by one process, a guarded
+;; state machine (invalid transitions are explicit errors, never silent
+;; no-ops):
+;;
+;;   none --request--> pending --approve--> active
+;;   active --lapse--> lapsed --reinstate--> active
+;;   {pending|active|lapsed} --revoke--> revoked   (terminal)
+;;
+;; A per-app GRANT PROJECTION renders that one canonical state into the
+;; view a given client app consumes — mirroring rose-ash's per-app grant
+;; verification. The projection is pure identity: it reports WHAT the
+;; subject's membership is for that app; it does NOT decide whether the
+;; app should let them in. That permission question is acl's, keyed off
+;; this projection.
+;;
+;;   project(Subject, App) ->
+;;     active  -> {member, Tier, App}
+;;     pending -> {pending, App}
+;;     lapsed  -> {lapsed, App}
+;;     revoked -> {denied, App}
+;;     none    -> {non_member, App}
+
+(define
+  identity-membership-source
+  "-module(identity_membership).\n\n   start() ->\n     spawn(fun () -> loop([]) end).\n\n   request(M, Subject, Tier) ->\n     M ! {request, Subject, Tier, self()},\n     receive {membership_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   approve(M, Subject) ->\n     M ! {approve, Subject, self()},\n     receive {membership_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   lapse(M, Subject) ->\n     M ! {lapse, Subject, self()},\n     receive {membership_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   reinstate(M, Subject) ->\n     M ! {reinstate, Subject, self()},\n     receive {membership_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   revoke(M, Subject) ->\n     M ! {revoke, Subject, self()},\n     receive {membership_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   status(M, Subject) ->\n     M ! {status, Subject, self()},\n     receive {membership_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   project(M, Subject, App) ->\n     M ! {project, Subject, App, self()},\n     receive {membership_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   loop(Members) ->\n     receive\n       {request, Subject, Tier, From} ->\n         case find(Subject, Members) of\n           none ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, ok},\n             loop([{Subject, {pending, Tier}} | Members]);\n           {ok, _} ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, {error, exists}},\n             loop(Members)\n         end;\n       {approve, Subject, From} ->\n         case find(Subject, Members) of\n           none ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, {error, not_found}},\n             loop(Members);\n           {ok, {pending, Tier}} ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, ok},\n             loop(set_record(Subject, {active, Tier}, Members));\n           {ok, {St, _}} ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, {error, St}},\n             loop(Members)\n         end;\n       {lapse, Subject, From} ->\n         case find(Subject, Members) of\n           none ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, {error, not_found}},\n             loop(Members);\n           {ok, {active, Tier}} ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, ok},\n             loop(set_record(Subject, {lapsed, Tier}, Members));\n           {ok, {St, _}} ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, {error, St}},\n             loop(Members)\n         end;\n       {reinstate, Subject, From} ->\n         case find(Subject, Members) of\n           none ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, {error, not_found}},\n             loop(Members);\n           {ok, {lapsed, Tier}} ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, ok},\n             loop(set_record(Subject, {active, Tier}, Members));\n           {ok, {St, _}} ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, {error, St}},\n             loop(Members)\n         end;\n       {revoke, Subject, From} ->\n         case find(Subject, Members) of\n           none ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, {error, not_found}},\n             loop(Members);\n           {ok, {_, Tier}} ->\n             From ! {membership_reply, ok},\n             loop(set_record(Subject, {revoked, Tier}, Members))\n         end;\n       {status, Subject, From} ->\n         case find(Subject, Members) of\n           none -> From ! {membership_reply, {none}};\n           {ok, {St, Tier}} -> From ! {membership_reply, {ok, St, Tier}}\n         end,\n         loop(Members);\n       {project, Subject, App, From} ->\n         From ! {membership_reply, project_view(Subject, App, Members)},\n         loop(Members);\n       {stop, From} ->\n         From ! {membership_reply, ok}\n     end.\n\n   project_view(Subject, App, Members) ->\n     case find(Subject, Members) of\n       none -> {non_member, App};\n       {ok, {active, Tier}} -> {member, Tier, App};\n       {ok, {pending, _}} -> {pending, App};\n       {ok, {lapsed, _}} -> {lapsed, App};\n       {ok, {revoked, _}} -> {denied, App}\n     end.\n\n   set_record(_, _, []) -> [];\n   set_record(Subject, Rec, [{S, Old} | Rest]) ->\n     case S =:= Subject of\n       true -> [{S, Rec} | Rest];\n       false -> [{S, Old} | set_record(Subject, Rec, Rest)]\n     end.\n\n   find(_, []) -> none;\n   find(Key, [{K, V} | Rest]) ->\n     case K =:= Key of\n       true -> {ok, V};\n       false -> find(Key, Rest)\n     end.")
+
+(define
+  identity-load-membership!
+  (fn () (erlang-load-module identity-membership-source)))

lib/identity/registry.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+;; identity/registry.sx — routes sessions by id and by (subject, client).
+;;
+;; The registry is the directory that makes SSO possible: one subject can
+;; hold many sessions (one per client), and the OAuth machine asks it the
+;; single question that drives silent login — \"is there a live session
+;; for this subject + this client?\". It stores (SessionId, Subject,
+;; Client, Pid) rows and answers:
+;;
+;;   whereis_session(Id)      -> {ok, Pid} | {error, not_found}
+;;   lookup(Subject, Client)  -> {ok, Pid} | {error, not_found}   (SSO probe)
+;;   sessions_for(Subject)    -> {ok, [SessionId, ...]}           (fan-out)
+;;
+;; The registry only routes — it holds no grant state and decides nothing.
+;; Liveness of the routed-to session is that session process's own affair.
+
+(define
+  identity-registry-source
+  "-module(identity_registry).\n\n   start() ->\n     spawn(fun () -> loop([]) end).\n\n   register(Reg, SessionId, Subject, Client, Pid) ->\n     Reg ! {register, SessionId, Subject, Client, Pid, self()},\n     receive {registry_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   whereis_session(Reg, SessionId) ->\n     Reg ! {whereis_session, SessionId, self()},\n     receive {registry_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   lookup(Reg, Subject, Client) ->\n     Reg ! {lookup, Subject, Client, self()},\n     receive {registry_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   sessions_for(Reg, Subject) ->\n     Reg ! {sessions_for, Subject, self()},\n     receive {registry_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   deregister(Reg, SessionId) ->\n     Reg ! {deregister, SessionId, self()},\n     receive {registry_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   stop(Reg) ->\n     Reg ! {stop, self()},\n     receive {registry_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   loop(Entries) ->\n     receive\n       {register, SessionId, Subject, Client, Pid, From} ->\n         From ! {registry_reply, ok},\n         loop([{SessionId, Subject, Client, Pid} | remove_id(SessionId, Entries)]);\n       {whereis_session, SessionId, From} ->\n         From ! {registry_reply, find_id(SessionId, Entries)},\n         loop(Entries);\n       {lookup, Subject, Client, From} ->\n         From ! {registry_reply, find_sc(Subject, Client, Entries)},\n         loop(Entries);\n       {sessions_for, Subject, From} ->\n         From ! {registry_reply, {ok, collect_subject(Subject, Entries)}},\n         loop(Entries);\n       {deregister, SessionId, From} ->\n         From ! {registry_reply, ok},\n         loop(remove_id(SessionId, Entries));\n       {stop, From} ->\n         From ! {registry_reply, ok}\n     end.\n\n   find_id(_, []) -> {error, not_found};\n   find_id(Id, [{Sid, _, _, Pid} | Rest]) ->\n     case Sid =:= Id of\n       true -> {ok, Pid};\n       false -> find_id(Id, Rest)\n     end.\n\n   find_sc(_, _, []) -> {error, not_found};\n   find_sc(Subject, Client, [{_, Su, Cl, Pid} | Rest]) ->\n     case Su =:= Subject of\n       true ->\n         case Cl =:= Client of\n           true -> {ok, Pid};\n           false -> find_sc(Subject, Client, Rest)\n         end;\n       false -> find_sc(Subject, Client, Rest)\n     end.\n\n   collect_subject(_, []) -> [];\n   collect_subject(Subject, [{Sid, Su, _, _} | Rest]) ->\n     case Su =:= Subject of\n       true -> [Sid | collect_subject(Subject, Rest)];\n       false -> collect_subject(Subject, Rest)\n     end.\n\n   remove_id(_, []) -> [];\n   remove_id(Id, [{Sid, Su, Cl, Pid} | Rest]) ->\n     case Sid =:= Id of\n       true -> remove_id(Id, Rest);\n       false -> [{Sid, Su, Cl, Pid} | remove_id(Id, Rest)]\n     end.")
+
+(define
+  identity-load-registry!
+  (fn () (erlang-load-module identity-registry-source)))

lib/identity/scoreboard.json

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "language": "identity",
+  "total_pass": 222,
+  "total": 222,
+  "suites": [
+    {"name":"session","pass":11,"total":11,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"token","pass":24,"total":24,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"registry","pass":9,"total":9,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"api","pass":10,"total":10,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"oauth","pass":17,"total":17,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"sso","pass":10,"total":10,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"membership","pass":17,"total":17,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"cache","pass":9,"total":9,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"audit","pass":11,"total":11,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"federation","pass":12,"total":12,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"expiry","pass":8,"total":8,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"clients","pass":11,"total":11,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"grants","pass":9,"total":9,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"device","pass":10,"total":10,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"facade","pass":9,"total":9,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"delegation","pass":8,"total":8,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"session-mgmt","pass":8,"total":8,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"exchange","pass":8,"total":8,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"introspect","pass":9,"total":9,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"par","pass":7,"total":7,"status":"ok"},
+    {"name":"dynreg","pass":5,"total":5,"status":"ok"}
+  ]
+}

lib/identity/scoreboard.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# identity-on-sx Scoreboard
+
+**Total: 222 / 222 tests passing**
+
+|  | Suite | Pass | Total |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| ✅ | session | 11 | 11 |
+| ✅ | token | 24 | 24 |
+| ✅ | registry | 9 | 9 |
+| ✅ | api | 10 | 10 |
+| ✅ | oauth | 17 | 17 |
+| ✅ | sso | 10 | 10 |
+| ✅ | membership | 17 | 17 |
+| ✅ | cache | 9 | 9 |
+| ✅ | audit | 11 | 11 |
+| ✅ | federation | 12 | 12 |
+| ✅ | expiry | 8 | 8 |
+| ✅ | clients | 11 | 11 |
+| ✅ | grants | 9 | 9 |
+| ✅ | device | 10 | 10 |
+| ✅ | facade | 9 | 9 |
+| ✅ | delegation | 8 | 8 |
+| ✅ | session-mgmt | 8 | 8 |
+| ✅ | exchange | 8 | 8 |
+| ✅ | introspect | 9 | 9 |
+| ✅ | par | 7 | 7 |
+| ✅ | dynreg | 5 | 5 |
+
+
+Generated by `lib/identity/conformance.sh`.

lib/identity/session.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+;; identity/session.sx — a session is an Erlang process.
+;;
+;; create  = spawn a session process holding {subject, client, status}
+;; lookup  = a message; the live process answers {ok, ...} or {error, S}
+;; expire  = explicit message OR an idle timeout the process arms itself
+;; revoke  = explicit message; the grant tombstones immediately
+;;
+;; Expiry is the process's own `receive ... after Ttl` timeout, never a
+;; global sweep. On timeout the process notifies its Owner and becomes a
+;; tombstone that still answers lookups — with {error, expired}, never a
+;; silent dead mailbox. A revoked or expired session is an explicit
+;; negative state, not the absence of a positive one.
+
+(define
+  identity-session-source
+  "-module(identity_session).\n\n   start(SessionId, Subject, Client, Owner, Ttl) ->\n     spawn(fun () -> active(SessionId, Subject, Client, Owner, Ttl) end).\n\n   lookup(Pid) ->\n     Pid ! {lookup, self()},\n     receive {session_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   touch(Pid) ->\n     Pid ! {touch, self()},\n     receive {session_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   expire(Pid) ->\n     Pid ! {expire, self()},\n     receive {session_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   revoke(Pid) ->\n     Pid ! {revoke, self()},\n     receive {session_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   stop(Pid) ->\n     Pid ! {stop, self()},\n     receive {session_reply, R} -> R end.\n\n   active(SessionId, Subject, Client, Owner, Ttl) ->\n     receive\n       {lookup, From} ->\n         From ! {session_reply, {ok, {SessionId, Subject, Client, active}}},\n         active(SessionId, Subject, Client, Owner, Ttl);\n       {touch, From} ->\n         From ! {session_reply, ok},\n         active(SessionId, Subject, Client, Owner, Ttl);\n       {expire, From} ->\n         From ! {session_reply, ok},\n         tombstone(SessionId, Subject, Client, expired);\n       {revoke, From} ->\n         From ! {session_reply, ok},\n         tombstone(SessionId, Subject, Client, revoked);\n       {stop, From} ->\n         From ! {session_reply, ok}\n     after Ttl ->\n       Owner ! {session_expired, SessionId},\n       tombstone(SessionId, Subject, Client, expired)\n     end.\n\n   tombstone(SessionId, Subject, Client, Status) ->\n     receive\n       {lookup, From} ->\n         From ! {session_reply, {error, Status}},\n         tombstone(SessionId, Subject, Client, Status);\n       {touch, From} ->\n         From ! {session_reply, {error, Status}},\n         tombstone(SessionId, Subject, Client, Status);\n       {expire, From} ->\n         From ! {session_reply, ok},\n         tombstone(SessionId, Subject, Client, Status);\n       {revoke, From} ->\n         From ! {session_reply, ok},\n         tombstone(SessionId, Subject, Client, revoked);\n       {stop, From} ->\n         From ! {session_reply, ok}\n     end.")
+
+(define
+  identity-load-session!
+  (fn () (erlang-load-module identity-session-source)))

lib/identity/tests/api.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+;; identity/tests/api.sx — the service facade end-to-end: login issues a
+;; session + token, verify proves identity, revoke and logout take effect
+;; immediately. Exercises session + token + registry through one door.
+
+(define id-api-test-count 0)
+(define id-api-test-pass 0)
+(define id-api-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-api-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-api-test-count (+ id-api-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-api-test-pass (+ id-api-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-api-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define ida-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idanm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-all!)
+
+;; ── login + verify (happy path) ──────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-api-test
+  "login then verify is active"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid, Tok} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       case identity:verify(Svc, Tok) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-api-test
+  "verify returns the logged-in subject"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid, Tok} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       case identity:verify(Svc, Tok) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject\n       end"))
+  "alice")
+
+(id-api-test
+  "verify returns the granted scope"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid, Tok} = identity:login(Svc, bob, cli, write),\n       case identity:verify(Svc, Tok) of\n         {active, _, _, Scope} -> Scope\n       end"))
+  "write")
+
+;; ── revoke is real through the facade ────────────────────────────
+
+(id-api-test
+  "revoked token verifies inactive immediately"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid, Tok} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       identity:revoke(Svc, Tok),\n       case identity:verify(Svc, Tok) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> still_valid;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+;; ── session lifecycle through the facade ─────────────────────────
+
+(id-api-test
+  "fresh session reports active"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, Sid, _Tok} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       identity:session_status(Svc, Sid)"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-api-test
+  "logout makes the session gone"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, Sid, _Tok} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       identity:logout(Svc, Sid),\n       identity:session_status(Svc, Sid)"))
+  "gone")
+
+(id-api-test
+  "status of an unknown session is gone"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev "Svc = identity:start(),\n       identity:session_status(Svc, 999)"))
+  "gone")
+
+;; ── independence: logins do not bleed into each other ────────────
+
+(id-api-test
+  "revoking one login leaves the other active"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, _S1, T1} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, _S2, T2} = identity:login(Svc, bob, cli, write),\n       identity:revoke(Svc, T1),\n       case identity:verify(Svc, T2) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "bob")
+
+(id-api-test
+  "logging out one session leaves the other active"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, S1, _T1} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, S2, _T2} = identity:login(Svc, alice, cli, read),\n       identity:logout(Svc, S1),\n       identity:session_status(Svc, S2)"))
+  "active")
+
+;; ── coordinator deregisters on a session_expired notification ────
+;; A live idle session fires its own `after` timeout and notifies its
+;; owner (the coordinator), which then deregisters it — timeout-driven,
+;; never swept. The owner-internal path can't be observed by driving the
+;; scheduler idle from the test's main process, so we assert the handler
+;; directly: the mailbox is FIFO, so the expiry notification is processed
+;; before the following status query.
+
+(id-api-test
+  "session_expired notification deregisters the session"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, Sid, _Tok} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read, 50),\n       active = identity:session_status(Svc, Sid),\n       Svc ! {session_expired, Sid},\n       identity:session_status(Svc, Sid)"))
+  "gone")
+
+(define
+  id-api-test-summary
+  (str "api " id-api-test-pass "/" id-api-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/audit.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+;; identity/tests/audit.sx — the grant audit ledger. Every grant
+;; transition is recorded; the ledger is queryable per subject and
+;; chronological. Covers issue/refresh/revoke wiring through the token
+;; registry, reuse-triggered revoke, per-subject isolation, completeness,
+;; and direct ledger use.
+
+(define id-audit-test-count 0)
+(define id-audit-test-pass 0)
+(define id-audit-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-audit-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-audit-test-count (+ id-audit-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-audit-test-pass (+ id-audit-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-audit-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define ida-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idanm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-audit!)
+(identity-load-token!)
+
+;; ── issue is audited ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-audit-test
+  "issue records one event for the subject"
+  (ida-ev
+    "A = identity_audit:start(),\n     Reg = identity_tokens:start(A),\n     identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n     identity_audit:count(A, alice)")
+  1)
+
+(id-audit-test
+  "the recorded action is issue"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "A = identity_audit:start(),\n       Reg = identity_tokens:start(A),\n       identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       case identity_audit:actions(A, alice) of\n         [issue] -> matched;\n         _ -> nomatch\n       end"))
+  "matched")
+
+;; ── full grant lifecycle is audited in order ─────────────────────
+
+(id-audit-test
+  "issue, refresh, revoke are recorded in order"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "A = identity_audit:start(),\n       Reg = identity_tokens:start(A),\n       {ok, G, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, G),\n       case identity_audit:actions(A, alice) of\n         [issue, refresh, revoke] -> matched;\n         _ -> nomatch\n       end"))
+  "matched")
+
+;; ── reuse-triggered revoke is audited ────────────────────────────
+
+(id-audit-test
+  "a refresh-reuse cascade records a revoke event"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "A = identity_audit:start(),\n       Reg = identity_tokens:start(A),\n       {ok, _G, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R),\n       identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R),\n       case identity_audit:actions(A, alice) of\n         [issue, refresh, revoke] -> matched;\n         _ -> nomatch\n       end"))
+  "matched")
+
+;; ── per-subject isolation ────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-audit-test
+  "the ledger separates subjects"
+  (ida-ev
+    "A = identity_audit:start(),\n     Reg = identity_tokens:start(A),\n     identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n     identity_tokens:issue(Reg, bob, cli, write),\n     identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, mobile, read),\n     identity_audit:count(A, alice)")
+  2)
+
+(id-audit-test
+  "an unaudited subject has zero events"
+  (ida-ev
+    "A = identity_audit:start(),\n     Reg = identity_tokens:start(A),\n     identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n     identity_audit:count(A, ghost)")
+  0)
+
+;; ── the full log accumulates across subjects ─────────────────────
+
+(id-audit-test
+  "all events accumulate in the ledger"
+  (ida-ev
+    "A = identity_audit:start(),\n     Reg = identity_tokens:start(A),\n     identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n     identity_tokens:issue(Reg, bob, cli, write),\n     length(identity_audit:all(A))")
+  2)
+
+;; ── completeness: no grant transition is dropped ─────────────────
+
+(id-audit-test
+  "the ledger is complete across a mixed transition stream"
+  (ida-ev
+    "A = identity_audit:start(),\n     Reg = identity_tokens:start(A),\n     identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n     {ok, _G, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, cli, read),\n     identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R),\n     {ok, B} = identity_tokens:issue(Reg, bob, web, read),\n     identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, B),\n     length(identity_audit:all(A))")
+  5)
+
+;; ── start/0 stays unaudited (no regression) ──────────────────────
+
+(id-audit-test
+  "an unaudited registry still issues working tokens"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+;; ── direct ledger use (e.g. login/consent events) ────────────────
+
+(id-audit-test
+  "events can be recorded directly on the ledger"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "A = identity_audit:start(),\n       identity_audit:record(A, alice, login),\n       identity_audit:record(A, alice, consent),\n       case identity_audit:actions(A, alice) of\n         [login, consent] -> matched;\n         _ -> nomatch\n       end"))
+  "matched")
+
+(id-audit-test
+  "an audit entry carries its subject"
+  (idanm
+    (ida-ev
+      "A = identity_audit:start(),\n       identity_audit:record(A, alice, login),\n       case identity_audit:audit(A, alice) of\n         [{_, Subject, _}] -> Subject;\n         _ -> nomatch\n       end"))
+  "alice")
+
+(define
+  id-audit-test-summary
+  (str "audit " id-audit-test-pass "/" id-audit-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/cache.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+;; identity/tests/cache.sx — delegated grant-verification cache. Proves
+;; the cache is live (hits/misses) AND that revocation stays real: a
+;; revoked token never reads valid out of the cache, because any revoke
+;; bumps the generation and forces re-validation.
+
+(define id-cache-test-count 0)
+(define id-cache-test-pass 0)
+(define id-cache-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-cache-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-cache-test-count (+ id-cache-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-cache-test-pass (+ id-cache-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-cache-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idc-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idcnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-token!)
+(identity-load-cache!)
+
+;; ── delegation: cache forwards to the registry ───────────────────
+
+(id-cache-test
+  "introspect through the cache returns active"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_grant_cache:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_grant_cache:issue(C, alice, web, read),\n       case identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+;; ── the cache is actually caching ────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-cache-test
+  "a repeated introspect is a cache hit"
+  (idc-ev
+    "C = identity_grant_cache:start(),\n     {ok, T} = identity_grant_cache:issue(C, alice, web, read),\n     identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, T),\n     identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, T),\n     case identity_grant_cache:stats(C) of {H, _} -> H end")
+  1)
+
+(id-cache-test
+  "the first introspect of a token is a miss"
+  (idc-ev
+    "C = identity_grant_cache:start(),\n     {ok, T} = identity_grant_cache:issue(C, alice, web, read),\n     identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, T),\n     identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, T),\n     case identity_grant_cache:stats(C) of {_, M} -> M end")
+  1)
+
+;; ── revocation stays real through the cache (the centrepiece) ─────
+
+(id-cache-test
+  "a revoked token introspects inactive through the cache"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_grant_cache:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_grant_cache:issue(C, alice, web, read),\n       identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, T),\n       identity_grant_cache:revoke(C, T),\n       case identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> still_valid;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+(id-cache-test
+  "revoke invalidates the cache (post-revoke read re-validates)"
+  (idc-ev
+    "C = identity_grant_cache:start(),\n     {ok, T} = identity_grant_cache:issue(C, alice, web, read),\n     identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, T),\n     identity_grant_cache:revoke(C, T),\n     identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, T),\n     case identity_grant_cache:stats(C) of {_, M} -> M end")
+  2)
+
+;; ── cascade visibility through the cache ──────────────────────────
+
+(id-cache-test
+  "cascade revocation is visible through the cache"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_grant_cache:start(),\n       {ok, A, R} = identity_grant_cache:issue_grant(C, alice, web, read),\n       identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, A),\n       identity_grant_cache:revoke(C, R),\n       case identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, A) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> still_valid;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+;; ── a sibling token re-validates correctly after a revoke ────────
+
+(id-cache-test
+  "revoking one token leaves an independent token valid"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_grant_cache:start(),\n       {ok, A} = identity_grant_cache:issue(C, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, B} = identity_grant_cache:issue(C, bob, cli, write),\n       identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, A),\n       identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, B),\n       identity_grant_cache:revoke(C, A),\n       case identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, B) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "bob")
+
+;; ── refresh flows through the cache and stays correct ────────────
+
+(id-cache-test
+  "a refreshed token introspects active through the cache"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_grant_cache:start(),\n       {ok, _A, R} = identity_grant_cache:issue_grant(C, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, A2, _R2} = identity_grant_cache:refresh(C, R),\n       case identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, A2) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+;; ── unknown token is inactive, and cached as such ────────────────
+
+(id-cache-test
+  "an unknown token introspects inactive through the cache"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_grant_cache:start(),\n       Bogus = make_ref(),\n       case identity_grant_cache:introspect(C, Bogus) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+(define
+  id-cache-test-summary
+  (str "cache " id-cache-test-pass "/" id-cache-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/clients.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+;; identity/tests/clients.sx — OAuth client registry: registration,
+;; public vs confidential authentication, and redirect_uri allow-listing.
+
+(define id-clients-test-count 0)
+(define id-clients-test-pass 0)
+(define id-clients-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-clients-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-clients-test-count (+ id-clients-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-clients-test-pass (+ id-clients-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-clients-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idc-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idcnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-clients!)
+
+;; ── registration + lookup ────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-clients-test
+  "a registered client looks up its type"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_clients:start(),\n       identity_clients:register(C, app1, confidential, s3cret, [uri1]),\n       case identity_clients:lookup(C, app1) of\n         {ok, Type, _} -> Type;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "confidential")
+
+(id-clients-test
+  "registering the same client twice is an error"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_clients:start(),\n       identity_clients:register(C, app1, confidential, s3cret, [uri1]),\n       case identity_clients:register(C, app1, public, none, [uri1]) of\n         ok -> ok;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "exists")
+
+(id-clients-test
+  "looking up an unregistered client is unknown_client"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_clients:start(),\n       case identity_clients:lookup(C, ghost) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> found;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "unknown_client")
+
+;; ── confidential client authentication ───────────────────────────
+
+(id-clients-test
+  "a confidential client authenticates with the right secret"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_clients:start(),\n       identity_clients:register(C, app1, confidential, s3cret, [uri1]),\n       case identity_clients:authenticate(C, app1, s3cret) of\n         {ok, Kind} -> Kind;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "confidential")
+
+(id-clients-test
+  "a confidential client with the wrong secret is invalid_client"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_clients:start(),\n       identity_clients:register(C, app1, confidential, s3cret, [uri1]),\n       case identity_clients:authenticate(C, app1, wrongsecret) of\n         {ok, _} -> accepted;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "invalid_client")
+
+(id-clients-test
+  "a public client needs no secret to authenticate"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_clients:start(),\n       identity_clients:register(C, spa, public, none, [uri1]),\n       case identity_clients:authenticate(C, spa, anything) of\n         {ok, Kind} -> Kind;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "public")
+
+(id-clients-test
+  "authenticating an unknown client is unknown_client"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_clients:start(),\n       case identity_clients:authenticate(C, ghost, x) of\n         {ok, _} -> accepted;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "unknown_client")
+
+;; ── redirect_uri allow-listing ───────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-clients-test
+  "a registered redirect_uri is valid"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_clients:start(),\n       identity_clients:register(C, app1, confidential, s3cret, [uri1, uri2]),\n       case identity_clients:valid_redirect(C, app1, uri1) of\n         true -> yes;\n         false -> no\n       end"))
+  "yes")
+
+(id-clients-test
+  "a second registered redirect_uri is also valid"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_clients:start(),\n       identity_clients:register(C, app1, confidential, s3cret, [uri1, uri2]),\n       case identity_clients:valid_redirect(C, app1, uri2) of\n         true -> yes;\n         false -> no\n       end"))
+  "yes")
+
+(id-clients-test
+  "an unregistered redirect_uri is rejected"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_clients:start(),\n       identity_clients:register(C, app1, confidential, s3cret, [uri1]),\n       case identity_clients:valid_redirect(C, app1, evil_uri) of\n         true -> yes;\n         false -> no\n       end"))
+  "no")
+
+(id-clients-test
+  "redirect validation for an unknown client is rejected"
+  (idcnm
+    (idc-ev
+      "C = identity_clients:start(),\n       case identity_clients:valid_redirect(C, ghost, uri1) of\n         true -> yes;\n         false -> no\n       end"))
+  "no")
+
+(define
+  id-clients-test-summary
+  (str "clients " id-clients-test-pass "/" id-clients-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/delegation.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+;; identity/tests/delegation.sx — the identity -> acl boundary.
+;; Authentication (identity) gates BEFORE authorization (acl): an inactive
+;; token is unauthenticated (401) and acl is never consulted; only an
+;; authenticated subject's request is delegated to acl for permit/deny.
+
+(define id-deleg-test-count 0)
+(define id-deleg-test-pass 0)
+(define id-deleg-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-deleg-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-deleg-test-count (+ id-deleg-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-deleg-test-pass (+ id-deleg-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-deleg-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idl-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idlnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-delegation!)
+
+;; Shared prelude: a token registry, a stub acl, and a token granting
+;; [read, write] to alice, all bound.
+(define
+  idl-setup
+  "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n   A = identity_delegation:stub_acl(),\n   {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, [read, write])")
+
+;; ── authenticated + acl permits ──────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-deleg-test
+  "an authenticated, permitted request returns the subject"
+  (idlnm
+    (idl-ev
+      (str
+        idl-setup
+        ", case identity_delegation:check(R, A, T, read, doc1) of\n             {ok, S} -> S;\n             {error, W} -> W\n           end")))
+  "alice")
+
+;; ── authenticated + acl denies → 403 ─────────────────────────────
+
+(id-deleg-test
+  "an authenticated but unpermitted request is forbidden"
+  (idlnm
+    (idl-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       A = identity_delegation:stub_acl(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, [read]),\n       case identity_delegation:check(R, A, T, write, doc1) of\n         {ok, _} -> permitted;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "forbidden")
+
+;; ── unauthenticated → 401, acl never consulted ───────────────────
+
+(id-deleg-test
+  "a revoked token is unauthenticated, not forbidden"
+  (idlnm
+    (idl-ev
+      (str
+        idl-setup
+        ", identity_tokens:revoke(R, T),\n           case identity_delegation:check(R, A, T, read, doc1) of\n             {ok, _} -> permitted;\n             {error, W} -> W\n           end")))
+  "unauthenticated")
+
+(id-deleg-test
+  "an unknown token is unauthenticated"
+  (idlnm
+    (idl-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       A = identity_delegation:stub_acl(),\n       Bogus = make_ref(),\n       case identity_delegation:check(R, A, Bogus, read, doc1) of\n         {ok, _} -> permitted;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "unauthenticated")
+
+(id-deleg-test
+  "an expired token is unauthenticated"
+  (idlnm
+    (idl-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       A = identity_delegation:stub_acl(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, [read], 100),\n       identity_tokens:advance(R, 100),\n       case identity_delegation:check(R, A, T, read, doc1) of\n         {ok, _} -> permitted;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "unauthenticated")
+
+;; ── 401 takes precedence over 403 (identity gates first) ─────────
+
+(id-deleg-test
+  "a revoked token with no matching scope is still unauthenticated"
+  (idlnm
+    (idl-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       A = identity_delegation:stub_acl(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, [admin]),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(R, T),\n       case identity_delegation:check(R, A, T, read, doc1) of\n         {ok, _} -> permitted;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "unauthenticated")
+
+;; ── acl is what decides for an authenticated subject ─────────────
+
+(id-deleg-test
+  "the same subject is permitted one action and denied another"
+  (idl-ev
+    "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n     A = identity_delegation:stub_acl(),\n     {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, [read]),\n     Allowed = case identity_delegation:check(R, A, T, read, doc1) of\n       {ok, _} -> 1; {error, _} -> 0 end,\n     Denied = case identity_delegation:check(R, A, T, write, doc1) of\n       {ok, _} -> 1; {error, _} -> 0 end,\n     Allowed - Denied")
+  1)
+
+(id-deleg-test
+  "identity does not widen permission beyond the token scope"
+  (idlnm
+    (idl-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       A = identity_delegation:stub_acl(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, [read, write]),\n       case identity_delegation:check(R, A, T, delete, doc1) of\n         {ok, _} -> permitted;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "forbidden")
+
+(define
+  id-deleg-test-summary
+  (str "delegation " id-deleg-test-pass "/" id-deleg-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/device.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+;; identity/tests/device.sx — device authorization grant (RFC 8628):
+;; authorize → poll(pending) → approve/deny out-of-band → poll(token/denied).
+
+(define id-device-test-count 0)
+(define id-device-test-pass 0)
+(define id-device-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-device-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-device-test-count (+ id-device-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-device-test-pass (+ id-device-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-device-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idd-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define iddnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-device!)
+
+;; ── polling before approval ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-device-test
+  "polling a pending device code is authorization_pending"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "D = identity_device:start(),\n       {ok, Dc, _Uc} = identity_device:authorize(D, tv, watch),\n       case identity_device:poll(D, Dc) of\n         {ok, _} -> got;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "authorization_pending")
+
+;; ── approve → token ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-device-test
+  "after approval, polling yields a working token"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "D = identity_device:start(),\n       {ok, Dc, Uc} = identity_device:authorize(D, tv, watch),\n       identity_device:approve(D, Uc, alice),\n       {ok, T} = identity_device:poll(D, Dc),\n       case identity_device:introspect(D, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-device-test
+  "the device token carries the approving subject"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "D = identity_device:start(),\n       {ok, Dc, Uc} = identity_device:authorize(D, tv, watch),\n       identity_device:approve(D, Uc, alice),\n       {ok, T} = identity_device:poll(D, Dc),\n       case identity_device:introspect(D, T) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject\n       end"))
+  "alice")
+
+(id-device-test
+  "the device token carries the requested scope"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "D = identity_device:start(),\n       {ok, Dc, Uc} = identity_device:authorize(D, tv, stream),\n       identity_device:approve(D, Uc, alice),\n       {ok, T} = identity_device:poll(D, Dc),\n       case identity_device:introspect(D, T) of\n         {active, _, _, Scope} -> Scope\n       end"))
+  "stream")
+
+;; ── deny ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-device-test
+  "after denial, polling is access_denied"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "D = identity_device:start(),\n       {ok, Dc, Uc} = identity_device:authorize(D, tv, watch),\n       identity_device:deny(D, Uc),\n       case identity_device:poll(D, Dc) of\n         {ok, _} -> got;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "access_denied")
+
+;; ── unknown codes ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-device-test
+  "polling an unknown device code is invalid_grant"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "D = identity_device:start(),\n       Bogus = make_ref(),\n       case identity_device:poll(D, Bogus) of\n         {ok, _} -> got;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+(id-device-test
+  "approving an unknown user code is unknown_code"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "D = identity_device:start(),\n       Bogus = make_ref(),\n       case identity_device:approve(D, Bogus, alice) of\n         ok -> ok;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "unknown_code")
+
+;; ── single-use device code ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-device-test
+  "the device code is single-use after issuing a token"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "D = identity_device:start(),\n       {ok, Dc, Uc} = identity_device:authorize(D, tv, watch),\n       identity_device:approve(D, Uc, alice),\n       identity_device:poll(D, Dc),\n       case identity_device:poll(D, Dc) of\n         {ok, _} -> got;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+;; ── guarded transitions ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-device-test
+  "approving an already-denied request is rejected"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "D = identity_device:start(),\n       {ok, _Dc, Uc} = identity_device:authorize(D, tv, watch),\n       identity_device:deny(D, Uc),\n       case identity_device:approve(D, Uc, alice) of\n         ok -> ok;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "denied")
+
+;; ── independence ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-device-test
+  "two device requests are independent"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "D = identity_device:start(),\n       {ok, Dc1, Uc1} = identity_device:authorize(D, tv, watch),\n       {ok, Dc2, _Uc2} = identity_device:authorize(D, cli, deploy),\n       identity_device:approve(D, Uc1, alice),\n       case identity_device:poll(D, Dc2) of\n         {ok, _} -> got;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "authorization_pending")
+
+(define
+  id-device-test-summary
+  (str "device " id-device-test-pass "/" id-device-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/dynreg.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+;; identity/tests/dynreg.sx — dynamic client registration (RFC 7591): the
+;; server generates the client_id + secret for self-service onboarding.
+
+(define id-dyn-test-count 0)
+(define id-dyn-test-pass 0)
+(define id-dyn-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-dyn-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-dyn-test-count (+ id-dyn-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-dyn-test-pass (+ id-dyn-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-dyn-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idd-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define iddnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-oauth!)
+
+;; ── self-service registration yields usable credentials ──────────
+
+(id-dyn-test
+  "a dynamically registered confidential client can get a token"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, Cid, Sec} = identity_oauth:register_dynamic(O, confidential, [uri1]),\n       {ok, T} = identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, Cid, Sec, batch),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-dyn-test
+  "the token's subject is the generated client id"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, Cid, Sec} = identity_oauth:register_dynamic(O, confidential, [uri1]),\n       {ok, T} = identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, Cid, Sec, batch),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, T) of\n         {active, Sub, _, _} ->\n           case Sub =:= Cid of true -> matches; false -> mismatch end;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "matches")
+
+;; ── the generated secret is required ─────────────────────────────
+
+(id-dyn-test
+  "a wrong secret for a dynamic client is invalid_client"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, Cid, _Sec} = identity_oauth:register_dynamic(O, confidential, [uri1]),\n       case identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, Cid, wrongsecret, batch) of\n         {ok, _} -> issued;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "invalid_client")
+
+;; ── uniqueness ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-dyn-test
+  "two registrations yield distinct client ids"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, C1, _} = identity_oauth:register_dynamic(O, confidential, [uri1]),\n       {ok, C2, _} = identity_oauth:register_dynamic(O, confidential, [uri1]),\n       case C1 =:= C2 of true -> collision; false -> distinct end"))
+  "distinct")
+
+;; ── a dynamic public client still cannot use client-credentials ──
+
+(id-dyn-test
+  "a dynamic public client is unauthorized for client-credentials"
+  (iddnm
+    (idd-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, Cid, Sec} = identity_oauth:register_dynamic(O, public, [uri1]),\n       case identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, Cid, Sec, batch) of\n         {ok, _} -> issued;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "unauthorized_client")
+
+(define
+  id-dyn-test-summary
+  (str "dynreg " id-dyn-test-pass "/" id-dyn-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/exchange.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+;; identity/tests/exchange.sx — token exchange (RFC 8693 §2.1): downscope a
+;; valid access token into a new independent token for a downstream service.
+
+(define id-xchg-test-count 0)
+(define id-xchg-test-pass 0)
+(define id-xchg-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-xchg-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-xchg-test-count (+ id-xchg-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-xchg-test-pass (+ id-xchg-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-xchg-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idx-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idxnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-oauth!)
+
+;; Shared prelude: an access token A for alice with scope [read, write].
+(define
+  idx-token
+  "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n   {consent_required, Rq} = identity_oauth:authorize(O, web, uri1, [read, write], alice, v),\n   {code, Cd} = identity_oauth:consent(O, Rq, allow),\n   {ok, A, _R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, Cd, web, uri1, v)")
+
+;; ── downscoping ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-xchg-test
+  "exchange downscopes to a subset"
+  (idxnm
+    (idx-ev
+      (str
+        idx-token
+        ", {ok, X} = identity_oauth:token_exchange(O, A, [read]),\n           case identity_oauth:introspect(O, X) of\n             {active, _, _, [read]} -> downscoped;\n             {active, _, _, _} -> other;\n             {inactive} -> inactive\n           end")))
+  "downscoped")
+
+(id-xchg-test
+  "the exchanged token keeps the subject"
+  (idxnm
+    (idx-ev
+      (str
+        idx-token
+        ", {ok, X} = identity_oauth:token_exchange(O, A, [read]),\n           case identity_oauth:introspect(O, X) of\n             {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject\n           end")))
+  "alice")
+
+(id-xchg-test
+  "exchange to the same scope is allowed"
+  (idxnm
+    (idx-ev
+      (str
+        idx-token
+        ", {ok, X} = identity_oauth:token_exchange(O, A, [read, write]),\n           case identity_oauth:introspect(O, X) of\n             {active, _, _, [read, write]} -> full;\n             {active, _, _, _} -> other;\n             {inactive} -> inactive\n           end")))
+  "full")
+
+;; ── scope cannot be widened ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-xchg-test
+  "exchange cannot widen beyond the subject token's scope"
+  (idxnm
+    (idx-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {consent_required, Rq} = identity_oauth:authorize(O, web, uri1, [read], alice, v),\n       {code, Cd} = identity_oauth:consent(O, Rq, allow),\n       {ok, A, _R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, Cd, web, uri1, v),\n       case identity_oauth:token_exchange(O, A, [read, write]) of\n         {ok, _} -> widened;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "invalid_scope")
+
+;; ── inactive subject token cannot be exchanged ───────────────────
+
+(id-xchg-test
+  "exchanging a revoked subject token is invalid_grant"
+  (idxnm
+    (idx-ev
+      (str
+        idx-token
+        ", identity_oauth:revoke(O, A),\n           case identity_oauth:token_exchange(O, A, [read]) of\n             {ok, _} -> issued;\n             {error, W} -> W\n           end")))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+;; ── independent lifecycles ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-xchg-test
+  "revoking the subject token does not revoke the exchanged token"
+  (idxnm
+    (idx-ev
+      (str
+        idx-token
+        ", {ok, X} = identity_oauth:token_exchange(O, A, [read]),\n           identity_oauth:revoke(O, A),\n           case identity_oauth:introspect(O, X) of\n             {active, _, _, _} -> still_active;\n             {inactive} -> inactive\n           end")))
+  "still_active")
+
+(id-xchg-test
+  "revoking the exchanged token does not revoke the subject token"
+  (idxnm
+    (idx-ev
+      (str
+        idx-token
+        ", {ok, X} = identity_oauth:token_exchange(O, A, [read]),\n           identity_oauth:revoke(O, X),\n           case identity_oauth:introspect(O, A) of\n             {active, _, _, _} -> still_active;\n             {inactive} -> inactive\n           end")))
+  "still_active")
+
+;; ── chained downscoping ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-xchg-test
+  "an exchanged token can itself be exchanged (chain)"
+  (idxnm
+    (idx-ev
+      (str
+        idx-token
+        ", {ok, X1} = identity_oauth:token_exchange(O, A, [read, write]),\n           {ok, X2} = identity_oauth:token_exchange(O, X1, [read]),\n           case identity_oauth:introspect(O, X2) of\n             {active, _, _, [read]} -> chained;\n             {active, _, _, _} -> other;\n             {inactive} -> inactive\n           end")))
+  "chained")
+
+(define
+  id-xchg-test-summary
+  (str "exchange " id-xchg-test-pass "/" id-xchg-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/expiry.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+;; identity/tests/expiry.sx — access-token expiry on a logical clock
+;; (RFC 6749 §4.2.2 expires_in). `advance` stands in for time passing;
+;; introspect returns inactive once the clock reaches a token's expiry.
+;; Refresh mints a fresh short-lived access token — the point of refresh.
+
+(define id-expiry-test-count 0)
+(define id-expiry-test-pass 0)
+(define id-expiry-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-expiry-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-expiry-test-count (+ id-expiry-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-expiry-test-pass (+ id-expiry-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-expiry-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define ide-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idenm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-token!)
+
+;; ── within TTL is active; past TTL is inactive ───────────────────
+
+(id-expiry-test
+  "a token within its TTL is active"
+  (idenm
+    (ide-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, read, 100),\n       identity_tokens:advance(R, 50),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(R, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-expiry-test
+  "a token at its TTL boundary is expired"
+  (idenm
+    (ide-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, read, 100),\n       identity_tokens:advance(R, 100),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(R, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+(id-expiry-test
+  "a token just before its TTL is still active"
+  (idenm
+    (ide-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, read, 100),\n       identity_tokens:advance(R, 99),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(R, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+;; ── no TTL (infinity) never expires ──────────────────────────────
+
+(id-expiry-test
+  "a token issued without a TTL never expires"
+  (idenm
+    (ide-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, read),\n       identity_tokens:advance(R, 100000),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(R, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+;; ── refresh mints a fresh short-lived token ──────────────────────
+
+(id-expiry-test
+  "refresh renews access after the old token expired"
+  (idenm
+    (ide-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, A, Rt} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(R, alice, web, read, 100),\n       identity_tokens:advance(R, 100),\n       inactive = case identity_tokens:introspect(R, A) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active; {inactive} -> inactive end,\n       {ok, A2, _R2} = identity_tokens:refresh(R, Rt),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(R, A2) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> renewed;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "renewed")
+
+(id-expiry-test
+  "the renewed token also expires after its own TTL"
+  (idenm
+    (ide-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, _A, Rt} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(R, alice, web, read, 100),\n       identity_tokens:advance(R, 100),\n       {ok, A2, _R2} = identity_tokens:refresh(R, Rt),\n       identity_tokens:advance(R, 100),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(R, A2) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+;; ── the logical clock ────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-expiry-test
+  "the clock starts at zero and advances"
+  (ide-ev
+    "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n     identity_tokens:advance(R, 7),\n     identity_tokens:advance(R, 35),\n     identity_tokens:now(R)")
+  42)
+
+;; ── expiry composes with revocation ──────────────────────────────
+
+(id-expiry-test
+  "an expired token is also inactive after revoke (no contradiction)"
+  (idenm
+    (ide-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, read, 100),\n       identity_tokens:advance(R, 200),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(R, T),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(R, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+(define
+  id-expiry-test-summary
+  (str "expiry " id-expiry-test-pass "/" id-expiry-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/facade.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+;; identity/tests/facade.sx — the unified facade: one coordinator wiring
+;; sessions+tokens, the audit ledger, and membership. Exercises the
+;; cross-module integration (login/logout auditing, audit history, member
+;; enrollment + projection) through the single `identity` door.
+
+(define id-facade-test-count 0)
+(define id-facade-test-pass 0)
+(define id-facade-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-facade-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-facade-test-count (+ id-facade-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-facade-test-pass (+ id-facade-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-facade-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idfc-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idfcnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-all!)
+
+;; ── login + logout are audited through the ledger ────────────────
+
+(id-facade-test
+  "login then logout records login, issue, logout in order"
+  (idfcnm
+    (idfc-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, Sid, _Tok} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       identity:logout(Svc, Sid),\n       case identity:history(Svc, alice) of\n         [login, issue, logout] -> ordered;\n         Other -> Other\n       end"))
+  "ordered")
+
+(id-facade-test
+  "revoking a token is audited"
+  (idfcnm
+    (idfc-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid, Tok} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       identity:revoke(Svc, Tok),\n       case identity:history(Svc, alice) of\n         [login, issue, revoke] -> ordered;\n         Other -> Other\n       end"))
+  "ordered")
+
+(id-facade-test
+  "history is per-subject"
+  (idfc-ev
+    "Svc = identity:start(),\n     identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n     identity:login(Svc, bob, cli, read),\n     identity:login(Svc, alice, mobile, read),\n     length(identity:history(Svc, alice))")
+  4)
+
+;; ── membership through the facade ────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-facade-test
+  "enroll makes the subject an active member"
+  (idfcnm
+    (idfc-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       identity:enroll(Svc, alice, supporter),\n       case identity:member_status(Svc, alice) of\n         {ok, St, _} -> St;\n         {none} -> none\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-facade-test
+  "enroll keeps the tier"
+  (idfcnm
+    (idfc-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       identity:enroll(Svc, alice, supporter),\n       case identity:member_status(Svc, alice) of\n         {ok, _, Tier} -> Tier\n       end"))
+  "supporter")
+
+(id-facade-test
+  "an enrolled member projects per-app"
+  (idfcnm
+    (idfc-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       identity:enroll(Svc, alice, basic),\n       case identity:member_project(Svc, alice, market) of\n         {member, _, App} -> App;\n         {Tag, _} -> Tag\n       end"))
+  "market")
+
+(id-facade-test
+  "a non-member projects as non_member"
+  (idfcnm
+    (idfc-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       case identity:member_project(Svc, stranger, blog) of\n         {member, _, _} -> member;\n         {Tag, _} -> Tag\n       end"))
+  "non_member")
+
+;; ── the facade still proves identity ─────────────────────────────
+
+(id-facade-test
+  "verify still returns the subject after login"
+  (idfcnm
+    (idfc-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid, Tok} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       case identity:verify(Svc, Tok) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "alice")
+
+;; ── identity and membership are distinct axes ────────────────────
+
+(id-facade-test
+  "logging in does not enroll membership"
+  (idfcnm
+    (idfc-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       case identity:member_status(Svc, alice) of\n         {ok, St, _} -> St;\n         {none} -> none\n       end"))
+  "none")
+
+(define
+  id-facade-test-summary
+  (str "facade " id-facade-test-pass "/" id-facade-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/federation.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+;; identity/tests/federation.sx — federated identity: trust-gated,
+;; advisory peer assertions + cross-instance subject mapping.
+
+(define id-fed-test-count 0)
+(define id-fed-test-pass 0)
+(define id-fed-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-fed-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-fed-test-count (+ id-fed-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-fed-test-pass (+ id-fed-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-fed-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idf-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idfnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-federation!)
+
+;; ── trust gating ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "an assertion from an untrusted peer is rejected"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       case identity_federation:assert_id(F, peer1, alice) of\n         {ok, _} -> accepted;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "untrusted")
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "a trusted peer's assertion is accepted"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       identity_federation:trust(F, peer1),\n       case identity_federation:assert_id(F, peer1, alice) of\n         {ok, _} -> accepted;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "accepted")
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "untrust closes the door to future assertions"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       identity_federation:trust(F, peer1),\n       identity_federation:untrust(F, peer1),\n       case identity_federation:assert_id(F, peer1, alice) of\n         {ok, _} -> accepted;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "untrusted")
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "trusted? is true for a trusted peer"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       identity_federation:trust(F, peer1),\n       case identity_federation:trusted(F, peer1) of\n         true -> yes;\n         false -> no\n       end"))
+  "yes")
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "trusted? is false for an unknown peer"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       identity_federation:trust(F, peer1),\n       case identity_federation:trusted(F, peer2) of\n         true -> yes;\n         false -> no\n       end"))
+  "no")
+
+;; ── advisory provenance ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "an asserted identity is flagged peer_asserted with its origin"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       identity_federation:trust(F, peer1),\n       {ok, L} = identity_federation:assert_id(F, peer1, alice),\n       case identity_federation:provenance(F, L) of\n         {peer_asserted, P} -> P;\n         {local} -> local\n       end"))
+  "peer1")
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "a non-federated subject has local provenance"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       case identity_federation:provenance(F, alice) of\n         {peer_asserted, _} -> peer_asserted;\n         {local} -> local\n       end"))
+  "local")
+
+;; ── cross-instance subject mapping ───────────────────────────────
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "remote subjects are namespaced by peer by default"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       case identity_federation:resolve(F, peer1, alice) of\n         {ok, {federated, _, Remote}} -> Remote;\n         _ -> other\n       end"))
+  "alice")
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "the same remote name from two peers maps to distinct subjects"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       {ok, L1} = identity_federation:resolve(F, peer1, alice),\n       {ok, L2} = identity_federation:resolve(F, peer2, alice),\n       case L1 =:= L2 of\n         true -> collision;\n         false -> distinct\n       end"))
+  "distinct")
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "an explicit map aliases a remote subject to a local one"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       identity_federation:trust(F, peer1),\n       identity_federation:map(F, peer1, alice, alice_local),\n       case identity_federation:assert_id(F, peer1, alice) of\n         {ok, alice_local} -> mapped;\n         {ok, _} -> unmapped;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "mapped")
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "a mapped subject keeps peer_asserted provenance"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       identity_federation:trust(F, peer1),\n       identity_federation:map(F, peer1, alice, alice_local),\n       identity_federation:assert_id(F, peer1, alice),\n       case identity_federation:provenance(F, alice_local) of\n         {peer_asserted, P} -> P;\n         {local} -> local\n       end"))
+  "peer1")
+
+(id-fed-test
+  "two peers asserting same name keep separate provenance"
+  (idfnm
+    (idf-ev
+      "F = identity_federation:start(),\n       identity_federation:trust(F, peer1),\n       identity_federation:trust(F, peer2),\n       {ok, L1} = identity_federation:assert_id(F, peer1, alice),\n       {ok, _L2} = identity_federation:assert_id(F, peer2, alice),\n       case identity_federation:provenance(F, L1) of\n         {peer_asserted, P} -> P;\n         {local} -> local\n       end"))
+  "peer1")
+
+(define
+  id-fed-test-summary
+  (str "federation " id-fed-test-pass "/" id-fed-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/grants.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+;; identity/tests/grants.sx — the client-credentials grant (RFC 6749
+;; §4.4): a confidential client authenticates and gets a token acting on
+;; its own behalf — no end-user, no refresh token (§4.4.3). Public clients
+;; cannot use it.
+
+(define id-grants-test-count 0)
+(define id-grants-test-pass 0)
+(define id-grants-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-grants-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-grants-test-count (+ id-grants-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-grants-test-pass (+ id-grants-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-grants-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idg-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idgnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-oauth!)
+
+;; ── confidential client-credentials happy path ───────────────────
+
+(id-grants-test
+  "a confidential client obtains a working token"
+  (idgnm
+    (idg-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       identity_oauth:register_client(O, svc, confidential, sk, [uri1]),\n       {ok, T} = identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, svc, sk, batch),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-grants-test
+  "the client-credentials token's subject is the client itself"
+  (idgnm
+    (idg-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       identity_oauth:register_client(O, svc, confidential, sk, [uri1]),\n       {ok, T} = identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, svc, sk, batch),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, T) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject\n       end"))
+  "svc")
+
+(id-grants-test
+  "the client-credentials token carries the requested scope"
+  (idgnm
+    (idg-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       identity_oauth:register_client(O, svc, confidential, sk, [uri1]),\n       {ok, T} = identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, svc, sk, reports),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, T) of\n         {active, _, _, Scope} -> Scope\n       end"))
+  "reports")
+
+(id-grants-test
+  "client-credentials issues no refresh token (single value)"
+  (idgnm
+    (idg-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       identity_oauth:register_client(O, svc, confidential, sk, [uri1]),\n       case identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, svc, sk, batch) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> pair;\n         {ok, _} -> single;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "single")
+
+;; ── authentication failures ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-grants-test
+  "a wrong client secret is invalid_client"
+  (idgnm
+    (idg-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       identity_oauth:register_client(O, svc, confidential, sk, [uri1]),\n       case identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, svc, wrong, batch) of\n         {ok, _} -> issued;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "invalid_client")
+
+(id-grants-test
+  "a public client cannot use client-credentials"
+  (idgnm
+    (idg-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       identity_oauth:register_client(O, spa, public, none, [uri1]),\n       case identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, spa, none, batch) of\n         {ok, _} -> issued;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "unauthorized_client")
+
+(id-grants-test
+  "an unregistered client cannot use client-credentials"
+  (idgnm
+    (idg-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       case identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, ghost, x, batch) of\n         {ok, _} -> issued;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "invalid_client")
+
+;; ── independence + real revocation for client tokens ─────────────
+
+(id-grants-test
+  "two confidential clients get independent tokens"
+  (idgnm
+    (idg-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       identity_oauth:register_client(O, svc1, confidential, k1, [uri1]),\n       identity_oauth:register_client(O, svc2, confidential, k2, [uri1]),\n       {ok, _T1} = identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, svc1, k1, batch),\n       {ok, T2} = identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, svc2, k2, batch),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, T2) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject\n       end"))
+  "svc2")
+
+(id-grants-test
+  "a client-credentials token can be revoked"
+  (idgnm
+    (idg-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       identity_oauth:register_client(O, svc, confidential, sk, [uri1]),\n       {ok, T} = identity_oauth:client_credentials(O, svc, sk, batch),\n       identity_oauth:revoke(O, T),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> still_valid;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+(define
+  id-grants-test-summary
+  (str "grants " id-grants-test-pass "/" id-grants-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/introspect.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+;; identity/tests/introspect.sx — RFC 7662 §2.2 full introspection metadata
+;; (sub, client_id, scope, exp, iat, token_type) alongside the live-lookup
+;; active/inactive semantics.
+
+(define id-intr-test-count 0)
+(define id-intr-test-pass 0)
+(define id-intr-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-intr-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-intr-test-count (+ id-intr-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-intr-test-pass (+ id-intr-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-intr-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idi-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idinm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-token!)
+
+;; ── metadata fields ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-intr-test
+  "introspect_full reports token_type bearer"
+  (idinm
+    (idi-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, read, 100),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect_full(R, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _, _, _, Tt} -> Tt;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "bearer")
+
+(id-intr-test
+  "introspect_full reports the subject"
+  (idinm
+    (idi-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, read, 100),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect_full(R, T) of\n         {active, Sub, _, _, _, _, _} -> Sub\n       end"))
+  "alice")
+
+(id-intr-test
+  "introspect_full reports the client_id"
+  (idinm
+    (idi-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, mobile, read, 100),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect_full(R, T) of\n         {active, _, Cl, _, _, _, _} -> Cl\n       end"))
+  "mobile")
+
+(id-intr-test
+  "introspect_full reports the scope"
+  (idinm
+    (idi-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, write, 100),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect_full(R, T) of\n         {active, _, _, Sc, _, _, _} -> Sc\n       end"))
+  "write")
+
+;; ── exp / iat reflect the logical clock ──────────────────────────
+
+(id-intr-test
+  "iat is the clock value at issue"
+  (idi-ev
+    "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n     identity_tokens:advance(R, 7),\n     {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, read, 100),\n     case identity_tokens:introspect_full(R, T) of\n       {active, _, _, _, _, Iat, _} -> Iat\n     end")
+  7)
+
+(id-intr-test
+  "exp is iat plus the ttl"
+  (idi-ev
+    "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n     identity_tokens:advance(R, 7),\n     {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, read, 100),\n     case identity_tokens:introspect_full(R, T) of\n       {active, _, _, _, Exp, Iat, _} -> Exp - Iat\n     end")
+  100)
+
+;; ── inactive / expired / revoked ─────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-intr-test
+  "an expired token introspects inactive in full mode too"
+  (idinm
+    (idi-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, read, 100),\n       identity_tokens:advance(R, 100),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect_full(R, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+(id-intr-test
+  "a revoked token introspects inactive in full mode"
+  (idinm
+    (idi-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, T} = identity_tokens:issue(R, alice, web, read),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(R, T),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect_full(R, T) of\n         {active, _, _, _, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+(id-intr-test
+  "an unknown token introspects inactive in full mode"
+  (idinm
+    (idi-ev
+      "R = identity_tokens:start(),\n       Bogus = make_ref(),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect_full(R, Bogus) of\n         {active, _, _, _, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+(define
+  id-intr-test-summary
+  (str "introspect " id-intr-test-pass "/" id-intr-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/membership.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+;; identity/tests/membership.sx — membership state machine + per-app
+;; grant projection. Valid transitions advance state; invalid ones are
+;; explicit errors. The projection renders one canonical state per app.
+
+(define id-membership-test-count 0)
+(define id-membership-test-pass 0)
+(define id-membership-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-membership-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-membership-test-count (+ id-membership-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-membership-test-pass (+ id-membership-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-membership-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idm-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idmnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-membership!)
+
+;; ── request → pending → approve → active ─────────────────────────
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "request leaves the subject pending"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       case identity_membership:status(M, alice) of\n         {ok, St, _} -> St;\n         {none} -> none\n       end"))
+  "pending")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "approve activates a pending membership"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       case identity_membership:status(M, alice) of\n         {ok, St, _} -> St;\n         {none} -> none\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "status keeps the requested tier"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, supporter),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       case identity_membership:status(M, alice) of\n         {ok, _, Tier} -> Tier\n       end"))
+  "supporter")
+
+;; ── guarded transitions: invalid moves are explicit errors ───────
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "requesting twice is an error"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       case identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic) of\n         ok -> ok;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "exists")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "approving an unknown subject is not_found"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       case identity_membership:approve(M, ghost) of\n         ok -> ok;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "not_found")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "approving an already-active membership is an error"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       case identity_membership:approve(M, alice) of\n         ok -> ok;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+;; ── lapse / reinstate ────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "active member can lapse"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       identity_membership:lapse(M, alice),\n       case identity_membership:status(M, alice) of\n         {ok, St, _} -> St\n       end"))
+  "lapsed")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "lapsing a pending membership is an error"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       case identity_membership:lapse(M, alice) of\n         ok -> ok;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "pending")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "lapsed member can reinstate to active"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       identity_membership:lapse(M, alice),\n       identity_membership:reinstate(M, alice),\n       case identity_membership:status(M, alice) of\n         {ok, St, _} -> St\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+;; ── revoke is terminal ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "any member can be revoked"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       identity_membership:revoke(M, alice),\n       case identity_membership:status(M, alice) of\n         {ok, St, _} -> St\n       end"))
+  "revoked")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "a revoked membership cannot be reinstated"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       identity_membership:revoke(M, alice),\n       case identity_membership:reinstate(M, alice) of\n         ok -> ok;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "revoked")
+
+;; ── per-app grant projection ─────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "active member projects as member"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       case identity_membership:project(M, alice, blog) of\n         {member, _, _} -> member;\n         {Tag, _} -> Tag\n       end"))
+  "member")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "projection carries the requesting app"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       case identity_membership:project(M, alice, market) of\n         {member, _, App} -> App\n       end"))
+  "market")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "the same subject projects consistently across apps"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, supporter),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       {member, T1, blog} = identity_membership:project(M, alice, blog),\n       {member, T2, events} = identity_membership:project(M, alice, events),\n       case T1 =:= T2 of\n         true -> T1;\n         false -> mismatch\n       end"))
+  "supporter")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "unknown subject projects as non_member"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       case identity_membership:project(M, ghost, blog) of\n         {Tag, _} -> Tag;\n         {Tag, _, _} -> Tag\n       end"))
+  "non_member")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "lapsed member projects as lapsed"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       identity_membership:lapse(M, alice),\n       case identity_membership:project(M, alice, blog) of\n         {Tag, _} -> Tag;\n         {Tag, _, _} -> Tag\n       end"))
+  "lapsed")
+
+(id-membership-test
+  "revoked member projects as denied"
+  (idmnm
+    (idm-ev
+      "M = identity_membership:start(),\n       identity_membership:request(M, alice, basic),\n       identity_membership:approve(M, alice),\n       identity_membership:revoke(M, alice),\n       case identity_membership:project(M, alice, blog) of\n         {Tag, _} -> Tag;\n         {Tag, _, _} -> Tag\n       end"))
+  "denied")
+
+(define
+  id-membership-test-summary
+  (str "membership " id-membership-test-pass "/" id-membership-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/oauth.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+;; identity/tests/oauth.sx — OAuth2 authorization-code flow (RFC 6749
+;; §4.1) + PKCE (RFC 7636) + refresh grant (§6). Covers the full happy
+;; path end-to-end (code exchange → access+refresh → refresh rotation) and
+;; every rejection: denied consent, single-use codes, client/redirect
+;; binding, PKCE mismatch, unknown code/request, refresh-token reuse, and
+;; revoke-then-use (which must fail).
+
+(define id-oauth-test-count 0)
+(define id-oauth-test-pass 0)
+(define id-oauth-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-oauth-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-oauth-test-count (+ id-oauth-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-oauth-test-pass (+ id-oauth-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-oauth-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define ido-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idonm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-token!)
+(identity-load-oauth!)
+
+;; Shared prelude: authorize + consent(allow) leaving Code bound.
+(define
+  ido-granted
+  "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n   {consent_required, ReqId} =\n     identity_oauth:authorize(O, webapp, uri1, read, alice, verif1),\n   {code, Code} = identity_oauth:consent(O, ReqId, allow)")
+
+;; ── full happy path ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "authorize asks for consent"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       case identity_oauth:authorize(O, webapp, uri1, read, alice, verif1) of\n         {consent_required, _} -> consent_required;\n         Other -> Other\n       end"))
+  "consent_required")
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "consent(allow) returns a code"
+  (idonm (ido-ev (str ido-granted ", case Code of _ -> issued end")))
+  "issued")
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "exchanged access token introspects active"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      (str
+        ido-granted
+        ", {ok, Tok, _R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, webapp, uri1, verif1),\n           case identity_oauth:introspect(O, Tok) of\n             {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n             {inactive} -> inactive\n           end")))
+  "active")
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "exchanged token carries the authorized subject"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      (str
+        ido-granted
+        ", {ok, Tok, _R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, webapp, uri1, verif1),\n           case identity_oauth:introspect(O, Tok) of\n             {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject\n           end")))
+  "alice")
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "exchanged token carries the authorized scope"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      (str
+        ido-granted
+        ", {ok, Tok, _R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, webapp, uri1, verif1),\n           case identity_oauth:introspect(O, Tok) of\n             {active, _, _, Scope} -> Scope\n           end")))
+  "read")
+
+;; ── refresh grant (RFC 6749 §6) end-to-end ───────────────────────
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "refresh after exchange yields a working access token"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      (str
+        ido-granted
+        ", {ok, _A, R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, webapp, uri1, verif1),\n           {ok, A2, _R2} = identity_oauth:refresh(O, R),\n           case identity_oauth:introspect(O, A2) of\n             {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n             {inactive} -> inactive\n           end")))
+  "active")
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "reusing a rotated refresh token is invalid_grant"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      (str
+        ido-granted
+        ", {ok, _A, R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, webapp, uri1, verif1),\n           {ok, _A2, _R2} = identity_oauth:refresh(O, R),\n           case identity_oauth:refresh(O, R) of\n             {ok, _, _} -> rotated;\n             {error, Why} -> Why\n           end")))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+;; ── consent denied (§4.1.2.1) ────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "denied consent yields access_denied"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {consent_required, ReqId} =\n         identity_oauth:authorize(O, webapp, uri1, read, alice, verif1),\n       case identity_oauth:consent(O, ReqId, deny) of\n         {error, Why} -> Why;\n         {code, _} -> issued\n       end"))
+  "access_denied")
+
+;; ── single-use codes (§10.5) ─────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "code cannot be exchanged twice"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      (str
+        ido-granted
+        ", identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, webapp, uri1, verif1),\n           case identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, webapp, uri1, verif1) of\n             {ok, _, _} -> replayed;\n             {error, Why} -> Why\n           end")))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+;; ── code binding to client + redirect_uri (§4.1.3) ───────────────
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "exchange with wrong client is invalid_grant"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      (str
+        ido-granted
+        ", case identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, attacker, uri1, verif1) of\n             {ok, _, _} -> ok;\n             {error, Why} -> Why\n           end")))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "exchange with wrong redirect_uri is invalid_grant"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      (str
+        ido-granted
+        ", case identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, webapp, evil_uri, verif1) of\n             {ok, _, _} -> ok;\n             {error, Why} -> Why\n           end")))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+;; ── PKCE verifier mismatch (RFC 7636) ────────────────────────────
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "exchange with wrong PKCE verifier is invalid_grant"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      (str
+        ido-granted
+        ", case identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, webapp, uri1, badverif) of\n             {ok, _, _} -> ok;\n             {error, Why} -> Why\n           end")))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+;; ── unknown code / request ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "exchanging an unknown code is invalid_grant"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       Bogus = make_ref(),\n       case identity_oauth:exchange(O, Bogus, webapp, uri1, verif1) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> ok;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "consent on an unknown request is unknown_request"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       Bogus = make_ref(),\n       case identity_oauth:consent(O, Bogus, allow) of\n         {code, _} -> issued;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "unknown_request")
+
+;; ── revoke-then-use must fail (RFC 7009) ─────────────────────────
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "revoked exchanged token introspects inactive"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      (str
+        ido-granted
+        ", {ok, Tok, _R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, webapp, uri1, verif1),\n           identity_oauth:revoke(O, Tok),\n           case identity_oauth:introspect(O, Tok) of\n             {active, _, _, _} -> still_valid;\n             {inactive} -> inactive\n           end")))
+  "inactive")
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "revoking the access token blocks a later refresh (cascade)"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      (str
+        ido-granted
+        ", {ok, A, R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, Code, webapp, uri1, verif1),\n           identity_oauth:revoke(O, A),\n           case identity_oauth:refresh(O, R) of\n             {ok, _, _} -> refreshed;\n             {error, Why} -> Why\n           end")))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+;; ── independence: two concurrent authorizations don't collide ────
+
+(id-oauth-test
+  "two authorizations issue independent grants"
+  (idonm
+    (ido-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {consent_required, R1} =\n         identity_oauth:authorize(O, webapp, uri1, read, alice, va),\n       {consent_required, R2} =\n         identity_oauth:authorize(O, cli, uri2, write, bob, vb),\n       {code, C1} = identity_oauth:consent(O, R1, allow),\n       {code, C2} = identity_oauth:consent(O, R2, allow),\n       {ok, _A1, _RR1} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, C1, webapp, uri1, va),\n       {ok, A2, _RR2} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, C2, cli, uri2, vb),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, A2) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject\n       end"))
+  "bob")
+
+(define
+  id-oauth-test-summary
+  (str "oauth " id-oauth-test-pass "/" id-oauth-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/par.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+;; identity/tests/par.sx — pushed authorization requests (PAR, RFC 9126):
+;; lodge the authorization params up front under a single-use request_uri,
+;; then redeem it into the normal consent flow. The binding (client,
+;; redirect, PKCE) carried by the pushed request is enforced at exchange.
+
+(define id-par-test-count 0)
+(define id-par-test-pass 0)
+(define id-par-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-par-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-par-test-count (+ id-par-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-par-test-pass (+ id-par-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-par-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idp-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idpnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-oauth!)
+
+;; ── pushed request redeems into consent ──────────────────────────
+
+(id-par-test
+  "authorize_pushed on a fresh request_uri asks for consent"
+  (idpnm
+    (idp-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, Ru} = identity_oauth:push_authorization_request(O, web, uri1, read, alice, v),\n       case identity_oauth:authorize_pushed(O, Ru) of\n         {consent_required, _} -> consent_required;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "consent_required")
+
+;; ── full PAR flow ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-par-test
+  "the full PAR flow yields a working token"
+  (idpnm
+    (idp-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, Ru} = identity_oauth:push_authorization_request(O, web, uri1, read, alice, v),\n       {consent_required, Rq} = identity_oauth:authorize_pushed(O, Ru),\n       {code, Cd} = identity_oauth:consent(O, Rq, allow),\n       {ok, A, _R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, Cd, web, uri1, v),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, A) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-par-test
+  "the PAR token carries the pushed subject"
+  (idpnm
+    (idp-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, Ru} = identity_oauth:push_authorization_request(O, web, uri1, read, alice, v),\n       {consent_required, Rq} = identity_oauth:authorize_pushed(O, Ru),\n       {code, Cd} = identity_oauth:consent(O, Rq, allow),\n       {ok, A, _R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, Cd, web, uri1, v),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, A) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject\n       end"))
+  "alice")
+
+;; ── request_uri is single-use ────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-par-test
+  "a request_uri cannot be redeemed twice"
+  (idpnm
+    (idp-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, Ru} = identity_oauth:push_authorization_request(O, web, uri1, read, alice, v),\n       identity_oauth:authorize_pushed(O, Ru),\n       case identity_oauth:authorize_pushed(O, Ru) of\n         {consent_required, _} -> reused;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "invalid_request_uri")
+
+(id-par-test
+  "an unknown request_uri is rejected"
+  (idpnm
+    (idp-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       Bogus = make_ref(),\n       case identity_oauth:authorize_pushed(O, Bogus) of\n         {consent_required, _} -> ok;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "invalid_request_uri")
+
+;; ── the pushed binding is still enforced at exchange ─────────────
+
+(id-par-test
+  "a PAR-issued code still enforces PKCE"
+  (idpnm
+    (idp-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, Ru} = identity_oauth:push_authorization_request(O, web, uri1, read, alice, v),\n       {consent_required, Rq} = identity_oauth:authorize_pushed(O, Ru),\n       {code, Cd} = identity_oauth:consent(O, Rq, allow),\n       case identity_oauth:exchange(O, Cd, web, uri1, wrongverif) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> ok;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+(id-par-test
+  "a PAR-issued code still enforces client binding"
+  (idpnm
+    (idp-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, Ru} = identity_oauth:push_authorization_request(O, web, uri1, read, alice, v),\n       {consent_required, Rq} = identity_oauth:authorize_pushed(O, Ru),\n       {code, Cd} = identity_oauth:consent(O, Rq, allow),\n       case identity_oauth:exchange(O, Cd, attacker, uri1, v) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> ok;\n         {error, W} -> W\n       end"))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+(define
+  id-par-test-summary
+  (str "par " id-par-test-pass "/" id-par-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/registry.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+;; identity/tests/registry.sx — routing by id and by (subject, client),
+;; SSO fan-out (one subject, many clients), and integration with live
+;; session processes routed through the registry.
+
+(define id-registry-test-count 0)
+(define id-registry-test-pass 0)
+(define id-registry-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-registry-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-registry-test-count (+ id-registry-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-registry-test-pass (+ id-registry-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-registry-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idr-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idrnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-session!)
+(identity-load-registry!)
+
+;; ── whereis by session id ────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-registry-test
+  "registered session is found by id"
+  (idrnm
+    (idr-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       Reg = identity_registry:start(),\n       identity_registry:register(Reg, s1, alice, web, Me),\n       case identity_registry:whereis_session(Reg, s1) of\n         {ok, _} -> found;\n         {error, _} -> missing\n       end"))
+  "found")
+
+(id-registry-test
+  "unknown session id is not_found, not a crash"
+  (idrnm
+    (idr-ev
+      "Reg = identity_registry:start(),\n       case identity_registry:whereis_session(Reg, nope) of\n         {ok, _} -> found;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "not_found")
+
+;; ── lookup by (subject, client) — the SSO probe ──────────────────
+
+(id-registry-test
+  "lookup finds a session for subject+client"
+  (idrnm
+    (idr-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       Reg = identity_registry:start(),\n       identity_registry:register(Reg, s1, alice, web, Me),\n       case identity_registry:lookup(Reg, alice, web) of\n         {ok, _} -> found;\n         {error, _} -> missing\n       end"))
+  "found")
+
+(id-registry-test
+  "lookup is precise: right subject, wrong client misses"
+  (idrnm
+    (idr-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       Reg = identity_registry:start(),\n       identity_registry:register(Reg, s1, alice, web, Me),\n       case identity_registry:lookup(Reg, alice, cli) of\n         {ok, _} -> found;\n         {error, _} -> missing\n       end"))
+  "missing")
+
+;; ── SSO fan-out: one subject, many clients ───────────────────────
+
+(id-registry-test
+  "sessions_for returns all of a subject's sessions"
+  (idr-ev
+    "Me = self(),\n     Reg = identity_registry:start(),\n     identity_registry:register(Reg, s1, alice, web, Me),\n     identity_registry:register(Reg, s2, alice, cli, Me),\n     identity_registry:register(Reg, s3, bob, web, Me),\n     case identity_registry:sessions_for(Reg, alice) of\n       {ok, L} -> length(L)\n     end")
+  2)
+
+(id-registry-test
+  "sessions_for an unknown subject is empty"
+  (idr-ev
+    "Reg = identity_registry:start(),\n     case identity_registry:sessions_for(Reg, ghost) of\n       {ok, L} -> length(L)\n     end")
+  0)
+
+;; ── re-register replaces the row for that id (no duplicates) ──────
+
+(id-registry-test
+  "re-registering an id does not duplicate it"
+  (idr-ev
+    "Me = self(),\n     Reg = identity_registry:start(),\n     identity_registry:register(Reg, s1, alice, web, Me),\n     identity_registry:register(Reg, s1, alice, web, Me),\n     case identity_registry:sessions_for(Reg, alice) of\n       {ok, L} -> length(L)\n     end")
+  1)
+
+;; ── deregister removes routing ───────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-registry-test
+  "deregistered session is no longer found"
+  (idrnm
+    (idr-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       Reg = identity_registry:start(),\n       identity_registry:register(Reg, s1, alice, web, Me),\n       identity_registry:deregister(Reg, s1),\n       case identity_registry:whereis_session(Reg, s1) of\n         {ok, _} -> found;\n         {error, _} -> missing\n       end"))
+  "missing")
+
+;; ── integration: route to a live session and look it up ──────────
+
+(id-registry-test
+  "routed-to session answers lookup as active"
+  (idrnm
+    (idr-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       Reg = identity_registry:start(),\n       S = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, infinity),\n       identity_registry:register(Reg, s1, alice, web, S),\n       {ok, Pid} = identity_registry:lookup(Reg, alice, web),\n       case identity_session:lookup(Pid) of\n         {ok, {_,_,_,St}} -> St;\n         {error, St} -> St\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(define
+  id-registry-test-summary
+  (str "registry " id-registry-test-pass "/" id-registry-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/session.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+;; identity/tests/session.sx — session-as-process: create, lookup,
+;; touch, explicit expire, revoke, and idle-timeout self-expiry.
+;; Negative paths are tested as first-class: a tombstoned session
+;; answers {error, Status}, it does not go silent.
+
+(define id-session-test-count 0)
+(define id-session-test-pass 0)
+(define id-session-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-session-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-session-test-count (+ id-session-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-session-test-pass (+ id-session-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-session-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define id-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-session!)
+
+;; ── create + lookup ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-session-test
+  "lookup of live session is active"
+  (idnm
+    (id-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       S = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, infinity),\n       case identity_session:lookup(S) of {ok, {_,_,_,St}} -> St end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-session-test
+  "lookup preserves subject"
+  (idnm
+    (id-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       S = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, infinity),\n       case identity_session:lookup(S) of {ok, {_,Subject,_,_}} -> Subject end"))
+  "alice")
+
+(id-session-test
+  "lookup preserves client"
+  (idnm
+    (id-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       S = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, infinity),\n       case identity_session:lookup(S) of {ok, {_,_,Client,_}} -> Client end"))
+  "web")
+
+;; ── touch keeps a live session ───────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-session-test
+  "touch on live session is ok"
+  (idnm
+    (id-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       S = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, infinity),\n       identity_session:touch(S)"))
+  "ok")
+
+;; ── explicit expire ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-session-test
+  "expire then lookup is error expired"
+  (idnm
+    (id-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       S = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, infinity),\n       identity_session:expire(S),\n       case identity_session:lookup(S) of {error, St} -> St end"))
+  "expired")
+
+(id-session-test
+  "touch on expired session is error"
+  (idnm
+    (id-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       S = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, infinity),\n       identity_session:expire(S),\n       case identity_session:touch(S) of {error, St} -> St end"))
+  "expired")
+
+;; ── revoke is immediate ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-session-test
+  "revoke then lookup is error revoked"
+  (idnm
+    (id-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       S = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, infinity),\n       identity_session:revoke(S),\n       case identity_session:lookup(S) of {error, St} -> St end"))
+  "revoked")
+
+;; ── idle-timeout self-expiry ─────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-session-test
+  "idle timeout notifies owner"
+  (idnm
+    (id-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       S = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, 50),\n       _ = identity_session:lookup(S),\n       receive {session_expired, Sid} -> Sid end"))
+  "s1")
+
+(id-session-test
+  "lookup after idle timeout is error expired"
+  (idnm
+    (id-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       S = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, 50),\n       _ = identity_session:lookup(S),\n       receive {session_expired, _} -> ok end,\n       case identity_session:lookup(S) of {error, St} -> St end"))
+  "expired")
+
+;; ── isolation: sessions are independent processes ────────────────
+
+(id-session-test
+  "expiring one session leaves the other active"
+  (idnm
+    (id-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       A = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, infinity),\n       B = identity_session:start(s2, bob, web, Me, infinity),\n       identity_session:expire(A),\n       case identity_session:lookup(B) of {ok, {_,_,_,St}} -> St end"))
+  "active")
+
+;; ── clean stop ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-session-test
+  "stop returns ok"
+  (idnm
+    (id-ev
+      "Me = self(),\n       S = identity_session:start(s1, alice, web, Me, infinity),\n       identity_session:stop(S)"))
+  "ok")
+
+(define
+  id-session-test-summary
+  (str "session " id-session-test-pass "/" id-session-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/session_mgmt.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+;; identity/tests/session_mgmt.sx — subject-wide session management:
+;; enumerate a subject's sessions and \"log out everywhere\".
+
+(define id-smgmt-test-count 0)
+(define id-smgmt-test-pass 0)
+(define id-smgmt-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-smgmt-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-smgmt-test-count (+ id-smgmt-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-smgmt-test-pass (+ id-smgmt-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-smgmt-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idsm-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idsmnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-all!)
+
+;; ── enumerate a subject's sessions ───────────────────────────────
+
+(id-smgmt-test
+  "sessions lists all of a subject's sessions"
+  (idsm-ev
+    "Svc = identity:start(),\n     identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n     identity:login(Svc, alice, cli, read),\n     length(identity:sessions(Svc, alice))")
+  2)
+
+(id-smgmt-test
+  "sessions is empty for a subject with none"
+  (idsm-ev
+    "Svc = identity:start(),\n     length(identity:sessions(Svc, stranger))")
+  0)
+
+;; ── log out everywhere ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-smgmt-test
+  "logout_all ends every session of the subject"
+  (idsmnm
+    (idsm-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       {ok, S1, _} = identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, S2, _} = identity:login(Svc, alice, cli, read),\n       identity:logout_all(Svc, alice),\n       case {identity:session_status(Svc, S1), identity:session_status(Svc, S2)} of\n         {gone, gone} -> both_gone;\n         _ -> some_left\n       end"))
+  "both_gone")
+
+(id-smgmt-test
+  "after logout_all the subject has no sessions"
+  (idsm-ev
+    "Svc = identity:start(),\n     identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n     identity:login(Svc, alice, cli, read),\n     identity:logout_all(Svc, alice),\n     length(identity:sessions(Svc, alice))")
+  0)
+
+(id-smgmt-test
+  "logout_all leaves other subjects' sessions intact"
+  (idsm-ev
+    "Svc = identity:start(),\n     identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n     identity:login(Svc, bob, web, read),\n     identity:logout_all(Svc, alice),\n     length(identity:sessions(Svc, bob))")
+  1)
+
+(id-smgmt-test
+  "logout_all on an unknown subject is ok, not a crash"
+  (idsmnm
+    (idsm-ev "Svc = identity:start(),\n       identity:logout_all(Svc, ghost)"))
+  "ok")
+
+;; ── logout_all is audited ────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-smgmt-test
+  "logout_all records a logout event"
+  (idsmnm
+    (idsm-ev
+      "Svc = identity:start(),\n       identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n       identity:logout_all(Svc, alice),\n       case identity:history(Svc, alice) of\n         [login, issue, logout] -> audited;\n         Other -> Other\n       end"))
+  "audited")
+
+(id-smgmt-test
+  "logout_all audits each of several sessions"
+  (idsm-ev
+    "Svc = identity:start(),\n     identity:login(Svc, alice, web, read),\n     identity:login(Svc, alice, cli, read),\n     identity:logout_all(Svc, alice),\n     length(identity:history(Svc, alice))")
+  6)
+
+(define
+  id-smgmt-test-summary
+  (str "session-mgmt " id-smgmt-test-pass "/" id-smgmt-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/sso.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+;; identity/tests/sso.sx — silent SSO (prompt=none, OIDC §3.1.2.1) as a
+;; fast-path through the authorization-code machine. One subject session,
+;; many client apps; no session → login_required (a negative state, not a
+;; redirect). Silently-issued codes carry the same client/redirect/PKCE
+;; binding as consented codes.
+
+(define id-sso-test-count 0)
+(define id-sso-test-pass 0)
+(define id-sso-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-sso-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-sso-test-count (+ id-sso-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-sso-test-pass (+ id-sso-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-sso-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define ids-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idsnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-token!)
+(identity-load-session!)
+(identity-load-registry!)
+(identity-load-oauth!)
+
+;; ── no session → login_required ──────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-sso-test
+  "silent authorize without a session is login_required"
+  (idsnm
+    (ids-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       case identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, dashboard, uri2, read, alice, vv) of\n         {code, _} -> got_code;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "login_required")
+
+;; ── established session → silent code ────────────────────────────
+
+(id-sso-test
+  "silent authorize for the same client returns a code"
+  (idsnm
+    (ids-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid} = identity_oauth:establish(O, alice, web),\n       case identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, web, uri1, read, alice, vv) of\n         {code, _} -> got_code;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "got_code")
+
+;; ── one session, many clients ────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-sso-test
+  "a different client gets a silent code off the same session"
+  (idsnm
+    (ids-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid} = identity_oauth:establish(O, alice, web),\n       case identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, dashboard, uri2, read, alice, vv) of\n         {code, _} -> got_code;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "got_code")
+
+(id-sso-test
+  "many clients all silently authorize off one session"
+  (idsnm
+    (ids-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid} = identity_oauth:establish(O, alice, web),\n       {code, _C1} = identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, dashboard, uri2, read, alice, vv),\n       {code, _C2} = identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, mobile, uri3, read, alice, vv),\n       case identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, billing, uri4, read, alice, vv) of\n         {code, _} -> got_code;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "got_code")
+
+;; ── full SSO → token ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-sso-test
+  "silent code exchanges to a working token"
+  (idsnm
+    (ids-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid} = identity_oauth:establish(O, alice, web),\n       {code, C} = identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, dashboard, uri2, read, alice, vv),\n       {ok, A, _R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, C, dashboard, uri2, vv),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, A) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-sso-test
+  "SSO token carries the subject"
+  (idsnm
+    (ids-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid} = identity_oauth:establish(O, alice, web),\n       {code, C} = identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, dashboard, uri2, read, alice, vv),\n       {ok, A, _R} = identity_oauth:exchange(O, C, dashboard, uri2, vv),\n       case identity_oauth:introspect(O, A) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject\n       end"))
+  "alice")
+
+;; ── silent codes keep the full binding ───────────────────────────
+
+(id-sso-test
+  "silent code still enforces PKCE at exchange"
+  (idsnm
+    (ids-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid} = identity_oauth:establish(O, alice, web),\n       {code, C} = identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, dashboard, uri2, read, alice, vv),\n       case identity_oauth:exchange(O, C, dashboard, uri2, wrongverif) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> ok;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+(id-sso-test
+  "silent code still enforces client binding at exchange"
+  (idsnm
+    (ids-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid} = identity_oauth:establish(O, alice, web),\n       {code, C} = identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, dashboard, uri2, read, alice, vv),\n       case identity_oauth:exchange(O, C, attacker, uri2, vv) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> ok;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+;; ── subject scoping: SSO is per subject ──────────────────────────
+
+(id-sso-test
+  "another subject is still login_required"
+  (idsnm
+    (ids-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, _Sid} = identity_oauth:establish(O, alice, web),\n       case identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, dashboard, uri2, read, bob, vv) of\n         {code, _} -> got_code;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "login_required")
+
+;; ── ending the session closes the SSO fast-path ──────────────────
+
+(id-sso-test
+  "after end_session, silent authorize is login_required"
+  (idsnm
+    (ids-ev
+      "O = identity_oauth:start(),\n       {ok, Sid} = identity_oauth:establish(O, alice, web),\n       identity_oauth:end_session(O, Sid),\n       case identity_oauth:silent_authorize(O, dashboard, uri2, read, alice, vv) of\n         {code, _} -> got_code;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "login_required")
+
+(define
+  id-sso-test-summary
+  (str "sso " id-sso-test-pass "/" id-sso-test-count))

lib/identity/tests/token.sx

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+;; identity/tests/token.sx — opaque tokens, grant-backed lookup, real
+;; revocation, refresh-token rotation, cascading revocation, and scope
+;; narrowing on refresh. The revoke-then-introspect and refresh-reuse
+;; paths are the security centrepieces.
+
+(define id-token-test-count 0)
+(define id-token-test-pass 0)
+(define id-token-test-fails (list))
+
+(define
+  id-token-test
+  (fn
+    (name actual expected)
+    (set! id-token-test-count (+ id-token-test-count 1))
+    (if
+      (= actual expected)
+      (set! id-token-test-pass (+ id-token-test-pass 1))
+      (append! id-token-test-fails {:name name :expected expected :actual actual}))))
+
+(define idt-ev erlang-eval-ast)
+(define idtnm (fn (v) (get v :name)))
+
+(identity-load-token!)
+
+;; ── issue + introspect (happy path) ──────────────────────────────
+
+(id-token-test
+  "fresh token introspects active"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, Tok} = identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, Tok) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "introspect returns the granted subject"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, Tok} = identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, Tok) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject\n       end"))
+  "alice")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "introspect returns the granted scope"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, Tok} = identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, write),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, Tok) of\n         {active, _, _, Scope} -> Scope\n       end"))
+  "write")
+
+;; ── opacity: distinct tokens, no cross-talk ──────────────────────
+
+(id-token-test
+  "two issues yield independent grants"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, A} = identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, B} = identity_tokens:issue(Reg, bob, cli, write),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, A),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, B) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "bob")
+
+;; ── revocation is real (RFC 7009) ────────────────────────────────
+
+(id-token-test
+  "revoked token introspects inactive immediately"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, Tok} = identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       active = case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, Tok) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active end,\n       identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, Tok),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, Tok) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> still_valid;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "revoke is idempotent"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, Tok} = identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, Tok),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, Tok)"))
+  "ok")
+
+;; ── unknown tokens are inactive, never an error/crash ────────────
+
+(id-token-test
+  "introspecting an unknown token is inactive"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       Bogus = make_ref(),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, Bogus) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "revoking an unknown token is ok, not a crash"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       Bogus = make_ref(),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, Bogus)"))
+  "ok")
+
+;; ── one revocation does not affect a sibling token ───────────────
+
+(id-token-test
+  "revoking one token leaves the other active"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, A} = identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, B} = identity_tokens:issue(Reg, alice, cli, read),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, A),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, B) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+;; ── issue_grant: access + refresh pair (RFC 6749 §4.1.4 / §5.1) ───
+
+(id-token-test
+  "issue_grant access token introspects active"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, A, _R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, A) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+;; ── refresh rotation (RFC 6749 §6) ───────────────────────────────
+
+(id-token-test
+  "refresh mints a working new access token"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, _A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, A2, _R2} = identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, A2) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "rotated token keeps the grant's subject"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, _A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, A2, _R2} = identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, A2) of\n         {active, Subject, _, _} -> Subject\n       end"))
+  "alice")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "refresh chains across rotations"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, _A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, _A2, R2} = identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R),\n       {ok, A3, _R3} = identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R2),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, A3) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "active")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "refreshing an unknown token is invalid_grant"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       Bogus = make_ref(),\n       case identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, Bogus) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> rotated;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+;; ── refresh-token reuse = theft → revoke the family (RFC 6819) ────
+
+(id-token-test
+  "reusing a superseded refresh token is invalid_grant"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, _A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, _A2, _R2} = identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R),\n       case identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> rotated;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "refresh reuse revokes the live descendant too"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, _A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       {ok, A2, _R2} = identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R),\n       identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, A2) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> still_valid;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+;; ── cascading revocation: revoke any token, the grant dies ───────
+
+(id-token-test
+  "revoking the access token blocks refresh"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, A),\n       case identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> refreshed;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "invalid_grant")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "revoking the refresh token deactivates the access token"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, read),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, R),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, A) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> active;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+;; ── scope as a set + narrowing on refresh (RFC 6749 §6 / §3.3) ───
+
+(id-token-test
+  "a list scope round-trips through introspect"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, A, _R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, [read, write]),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, A) of\n         {active, _, _, [read, write]} -> matched;\n         {active, _, _, _} -> other;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "matched")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "refresh can narrow the scope to a subset"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, _A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, [read, write]),\n       {ok, A2, _R2} = identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R, [read]),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, A2) of\n         {active, _, _, [read]} -> narrowed;\n         {active, _, _, _} -> other;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "narrowed")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "refresh cannot widen scope beyond the grant"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, _A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, [read]),\n       case identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R, [read, write]) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> widened;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "invalid_scope")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "an invalid_scope refresh does not consume the refresh token"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, _A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, [read, write]),\n       identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R, [admin]),\n       case identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R, [read]) of\n         {ok, _, _} -> still_usable;\n         {error, Why} -> Why\n       end"))
+  "still_usable")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "plain refresh keeps the full grant scope"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, _A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, [read, write]),\n       {ok, A2, _R2} = identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, A2) of\n         {active, _, _, [read, write]} -> full;\n         {active, _, _, _} -> other;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "full")
+
+(id-token-test
+  "a narrowed token still cascades on revoke"
+  (idtnm
+    (idt-ev
+      "Reg = identity_tokens:start(),\n       {ok, _A, R} = identity_tokens:issue_grant(Reg, alice, web, [read, write]),\n       {ok, A2, _R2} = identity_tokens:refresh(Reg, R, [read]),\n       identity_tokens:revoke(Reg, A2),\n       case identity_tokens:introspect(Reg, A2) of\n         {active, _, _, _} -> still_valid;\n         {inactive} -> inactive\n       end"))
+  "inactive")
+
+(define
+  id-token-test-summary
+  (str "token " id-token-test-pass "/" id-token-test-count))

plans/identity-on-sx.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ through the event log, all authorization questions delegated to `acl-on-sx`.
 
 ## Status (rolling)
 
-`bash lib/identity/conformance.sh` → **0/0** (not yet started)
+`bash lib/identity/conformance.sh` → **222/222** (4 phases + 13 ext) — needs `timeout 580`
 
 ## Ground rules
 
@@ -57,28 +57,221 @@ lib/identity/api.sx ── (identity/login) (identity/grant?) (identity/revoke)
 ```
 
 ## Phase 1 — Sessions + tokens
-- [ ] `session.sx` — session process, create/lookup/expire
-- [ ] `token.sx` — issue/introspect/revoke (opaque, grant-backed)
-- [ ] `registry.sx` — route by subject/client
-- [ ] `api.sx` + tests + scoreboard + conformance.sh
+- [x] `session.sx` — session process, create/lookup/expire
+- [x] `token.sx` — issue/introspect/revoke (opaque, grant-backed)
+- [x] `registry.sx` — route by subject/client
+- [x] `api.sx` + tests + scoreboard + conformance.sh
 
 ## Phase 2 — OAuth2 flows
-- [ ] authorization-code flow as a message protocol
-- [ ] refresh + rotation; revocation cascades to issued tokens
-- [ ] tests: full code exchange, refresh, revoke-then-use (must fail)
+- [x] authorization-code flow as a message protocol
+- [x] refresh + rotation; revocation cascades to issued tokens
+- [x] tests: full code exchange, refresh, revoke-then-use (must fail)
 
 ## Phase 3 — Silent SSO + membership
-- [ ] `prompt=none` cross-app login (one session, many clients)
-- [ ] membership state + per-app grant projection
-- [ ] grant verification delegated cache (mirror Redis-cache pattern)
+- [x] `prompt=none` cross-app login (one session, many clients)
+- [x] membership state + per-app grant projection
+- [x] grant verification delegated cache (mirror Redis-cache pattern)
 
 ## Phase 4 — Audit + federation
-- [ ] every issue/refresh/revoke is a `persist` event; `(identity/audit subject)`
-- [ ] federated identity (peer-asserted subject) — advisory, trust-gated stub
-- [ ] tests: audit completeness, cross-instance subject mapping
+- [x] every issue/refresh/revoke is a `persist` event; `(identity/audit subject)`
+- [x] federated identity (peer-asserted subject) — advisory, trust-gated stub
+- [x] tests: audit completeness, cross-instance subject mapping
+
+## Extensions (base roadmap complete; deepen the engine)
+- [~] PKCE S256 method (RFC 7636 §4.2) — BLOCKED on erlang substrate (see Blockers)
+- [x] access-token TTL / `expires_in` — logical-clock expiry, introspect honours it
+- [x] scope as a set + scope narrowing on refresh (RFC 6749 §6)
+- [x] client registry: public vs confidential clients, client authentication (RFC 6749 §2)
+- [x] client-credentials grant (RFC 6749 §4.4) + device grant (RFC 8628)
+- [x] acl-on-sx delegation: identity-gates-before-acl boundary (401 vs 403), stub decider (live Datalog bridge is cross-substrate)
+- [~] OAuth `state`/OIDC `nonce` — low value in this server-centric model (client-side echo); skipped
+- [x] pushed authorization requests (PAR, RFC 9126): single-use request_uri → consent
+- [x] dynamic client registration (RFC 7591): server-generated client_id + secret
+- [x] unify `api.sx` over membership + audit (one facade, audited login/logout)
+- [x] subject-wide session management: `sessions(Subject)` + `logout_all` (log out everywhere)
+- [x] token exchange (RFC 8693): downscope a token into a new independent token
+- [x] RFC 7662 full introspection metadata (`introspect_full`: sub/client_id/scope/exp/iat/token_type)
 
 ## Progress log
-(loop fills this in)
+- 2026-06-07 — dynamic client registration (ext, RFC 7591): `register_dynamic`
+  generates a client_id + secret server-side (make_ref each) and registers the
+  client, returning {ok, ClientId, Secret} — self-service onboarding distinct
+  from the manual register_client. A dynamic confidential client can then use
+  client_credentials; a dynamic public client stays unauthorized_client. New
+  tests/dynreg.sx (5). 217→222.
+- 2026-06-07 — PAR (ext, RFC 9126): `push_authorization_request` lodges the
+  authorization params under a single-use `request_uri`; `authorize_pushed`
+  redeems it into the normal consent flow. Pushed requests reuse the pending
+  store (`{pushed, Rec}` keyed by the request_uri ref — distinct from consent
+  req_ids, no collision), so no new loop state. The pushed binding (client +
+  redirect + PKCE) is enforced at exchange. New tests/par.sx (7). 210→217.
+- 2026-06-07 — full introspection (ext, RFC 7662 §2.2): `introspect_full`
+  returns {active, Subject, Client, Scope, Exp, Iat, bearer} for live tokens,
+  {inactive} otherwise — deepening the opaque-token/live-lookup model the
+  whole design rests on. Access tokens now carry `Iat` (clock-at-issue);
+  exp = iat + ttl. Simple `introspect` unchanged. New tests/introspect.sx (9).
+  201→210. NOTE: conformance now needs an explicit long timeout (>120s, 19
+  suites) — run with `timeout 580`.
+- 2026-06-07 — token exchange (ext, RFC 8693 §2.1): `oauth.sx` gains
+  `token_exchange(SubjectToken, RequestedScope)` — a valid access token is
+  downscoped into a NEW independent grant for the same subject (subset only,
+  else invalid_scope; inactive subject token → invalid_grant). The new token's
+  lifecycle is independent (revoking either leaves the other active);
+  exchanges chain. Least-privilege handoff to downstream services. New
+  tests/exchange.sx (8). 193→201.
+- 2026-06-07 — subject-wide session management (ext): `api.sx` gains
+  `sessions(Subject)` (enumerate) and `logout_all(Subject)` ("log out
+  everywhere") — revokes + deregisters every session a subject holds,
+  auditing a logout per session, leaving other subjects untouched. Builds on
+  registry.sessions_for. New tests/session_mgmt.sx (8). 185→193.
+- 2026-06-07 — `delegation.sx` (ext): the identity→acl boundary made concrete.
+  `check` introspects the token first: inactive → `{error, unauthenticated}`
+  (401, acl never consulted); active → constructs {Subject, Scope, Action,
+  Resource} and hands off to acl, which returns permit/deny (`forbidden` =
+  403). 401 strictly precedes 403 (a revoked token with no scope is still
+  unauthenticated). acl-on-sx (Datalog) is a different SX guest language —
+  wired at the integration layer — so the decider here is a labelled stub
+  (permits when Action ∈ Scope); swap the pid, boundary unchanged. New
+  tests/delegation.sx (8). 177→185. **Extensions backlog clear.**
+- 2026-06-07 — unified facade (ext): `api.sx` coordinator now owns an audit
+  ledger + a membership registry alongside its token table (started with the
+  ledger) and session registry. login/logout are audited; new ops
+  `history`/`enroll`/`member_status`/`member_project` expose the audit +
+  membership axes through the one `identity` door. identity proves who +
+  reports membership; acl still decides permission. Existing api behaviour
+  unchanged (10/10). New tests/facade.sx (9). 168→177.
+- 2026-06-07 — `device.sx` (ext, RFC 8628): device authorization grant for
+  input-constrained devices. authorize → {device_code, user_code}; the human
+  approve/deny out-of-band by user_code; the device polls by device_code
+  through the §3.5 status machine (authorization_pending → access_denied /
+  {ok,Token}). Device code is single-use once a token issues; guarded
+  transitions (approve-after-deny rejected). Tokens grant-backed. Device-code
+  expiry + slow_down deferred (no wall clock). New tests/device.sx (10). 158→168.
+- 2026-06-07 — client-credentials grant (ext, RFC 6749 §4.4): `oauth.sx` now
+  owns a client registry (loop/6); `register_client` + `client_credentials`.
+  A confidential client authenticates and gets a token acting on its own
+  behalf (subject = the client), no refresh token (§4.4.3). A public client is
+  `unauthorized_client`; any auth failure (unknown client OR wrong secret) is
+  `invalid_client` — no client-existence oracle (§5.2). `identity-load-oauth!`
+  now pulls its deps (token/session/registry/clients). New tests/grants.sx (9).
+  149→158.
+- 2026-06-07 — `clients.sx` (ext): OAuth client registry (RFC 6749 §2). public
+  vs confidential clients; confidential clients MUST present the right secret
+  (wrong → invalid_client), public clients are identified but not
+  authenticated; redirect_uris are allow-listed with exact-match
+  `valid_redirect` (§3.1.2.2 + Security BCP). Standalone module (no oauth
+  wiring yet — that's a follow-up). New tests/clients.sx (11). 138→149.
+- 2026-06-07 — access-token expiry (ext): logical clock in the token registry
+  (`advance`/`now`; no wall clock in substrate). Grants carry a Ttl; each
+  access token carries an Expires (Now-at-issue + Ttl, or infinity); introspect
+  returns inactive once `Now` reaches it. Refresh mints a fresh short-lived
+  access token (new Expires) — short access tokens, long refresh tokens. issue/4
+  + issue_grant/4 default to infinity, so all prior tests unchanged. New
+  tests/expiry.sx (8). token loop/6. 130→138.
+- 2026-06-07 — scope narrowing (ext): each access token now carries its own
+  EFFECTIVE scope (<= the grant's max). `refresh/3` requests a narrower scope;
+  the request must be a subset of the grant scope (RFC 6749 §6) else
+  `{error, invalid_scope}` and the refresh token is NOT consumed (client may
+  retry, §5.2). `refresh/2` keeps full scope; scope stays opaque (atom or list)
+  for issue, so all prior atom-scope tests pass unchanged. token 18→24, 130/130.
+  Also filed Blocker: PKCE S256 needs SHA256+binary compare, both broken in the
+  erlang substrate (binary `=:=` always true; crypto:hash ignores binary
+  content) — deferred, plain method stays.
+- 2026-06-07 — `federation.sx`: trust-gated, advisory federated identity.
+  A peer assertion is accepted only from an explicitly trusted peer
+  (else `{error, untrusted}`) and is flagged `{peer_asserted, Peer}`, never
+  promoted to local authority — acl decides what it may do. Cross-instance
+  subject mapping namespaces remote subjects by peer (`{federated, Peer,
+  Remote}`) so two peers' "alice" never collide, with optional explicit
+  aliasing. Added an audit-completeness test (mixed transition stream → no
+  event dropped). New tests/federation.sx (12). **Phase 4 complete — all four
+  phases done.** +13 → 124/124.
+- 2026-06-07 — `audit.sx`: append-only grant audit ledger (an Erlang
+  process). `token.sx` gains `start/1(Audit)` and emits issue/refresh/revoke
+  events (incl. reuse-triggered revoke); `start/0` stays unaudited (no
+  regression — token.sx has no compile-time dep on the audit module, just
+  sends to a pid). Ledger queryable per subject — `audit`/`actions`/`count`/
+  `all`, chronological. In-memory event stream (persist-backing is a future
+  Erlang↔persist bridge, out of scope per loop allowance). New
+  tests/audit.sx (10). +10 → 111/111.
+- 2026-06-07 — `cache.sx`: delegated grant-verification cache (Redis-cache
+  pattern) wrapping the token registry. introspect memoised; generation
+  invalidation keeps revocation real — any revoke/refresh bumps a generation
+  counter so every cached positive instantly becomes a miss and re-validates
+  against the live registry. A revoked token never reads valid from cache.
+  stats() exposes hits/misses. New tests/cache.sx (9). **Phase 3 complete.**
+  +9 → 101/101.
+- 2026-06-07 — `membership.sx`: coop membership as a guarded state machine
+  (none→pending→active→lapsed⇄active, any→revoked terminal); invalid
+  transitions are explicit `{error, CurrentStatus}`. `project(Subject, App)`
+  renders the one canonical state into a per-app claim
+  ({member,Tier,App}/{pending,App}/{lapsed,App}/{denied,App}/{non_member,App})
+  — identity reports what; acl decides whether. New tests/membership.sx (17).
+  +17 → 92/92.
+- 2026-06-07 — silent SSO (`prompt=none`, OIDC §3.1.2.1): `oauth.sx` now owns
+  a session registry; `establish` creates a subject session, `silent_authorize`
+  asks "does this subject have a live session?" → mints a code (skipping
+  consent) bound to client+redirect+PKCE, else `login_required`. Same machine,
+  fast-path — one session, many clients; `end_session` closes the path.
+  New `tests/sso.sx` (10). +10 → 75/75.
+- 2026-06-07 — `oauth.sx` refresh wiring + e2e: exchange now issues an
+  access+refresh pair (RFC 6749 §4.1.4/§5.1) via token.sx issue_grant; added
+  the refresh grant (§6) delegating to token rotation. End-to-end tests:
+  code-exchange→refresh→introspect, refresh-reuse rejected, and
+  revoke-then-refresh blocked by cascade. **Phase 2 complete.** +3 → oauth 17,
+  65/65.
+- 2026-06-07 — `token.sx` grant-centric rewrite: refresh-token rotation
+  (RFC 6749 §6) + cascading revocation. The grant {Subject,Client,Scope,
+  Status} is the cascade unit; access + refresh tokens reference it.
+  `issue_grant` → {ok, Access, Refresh}; `refresh` supersedes the old
+  refresh + mints a new pair; reusing a superseded refresh token revokes
+  the whole family (RFC 6819 §5.2.2.3), killing the live descendant.
+  `revoke` of ANY token (access or refresh) cascades to the grant. All
+  prior issue/introspect/revoke behaviour preserved. +9 → token 18, 62/62.
+- 2026-06-07 — `oauth.sx`: OAuth2 authorization-code flow as a message
+  protocol (RFC 6749 §4.1) + PKCE (RFC 7636, plain). State machine on one
+  authz-server process: authorize → {consent_required} → consent →
+  {code} → exchange → {ok, Token}. Exchange enforces single-use codes
+  (§10.5; removed on first attempt, replay → invalid_grant), client_id +
+  redirect_uri binding (§4.1.3), and PKCE verifier match. Issued tokens are
+  grant-backed so revocation stays real. +14 → 53/53.
+- 2026-06-06 — `api.sx`: service facade. `identity:start()` spawns one
+  coordinator owning the token table + session registry; exposes
+  login/verify/revoke/logout/session_status. Coordinator is the sessions'
+  owner, so an expired session deregisters itself (timeout-driven, no
+  sweep). `verify` answers IDENTITY only ({active, Subject, Client, Scope});
+  permission is acl's job — explicit delegation boundary. **Phase 1 complete.**
+  +10 → 39/39.
+- 2026-06-06 — `registry.sx`: directory process routing sessions by id and
+  by (subject, client). Answers the SSO probe `lookup(Subject, Client)` and
+  the fan-out `sessions_for(Subject)` (one subject, many clients). Routes
+  only — holds no grant state. Integration-tested end-to-end: register a live
+  session, route to it, confirm it answers active. +9 → 29/29.
+- 2026-06-06 — `token.sx`: opaque grant-backed tokens. Token = `make_ref`
+  (carries no info); the token table is a process; `introspect` is a live
+  lookup every time so revocation is real (RFC 7009) — a revoked token reads
+  `{inactive}` on the next introspection, no validity window. Reply shapes
+  follow RFC 7662 §2.2 (`{active,...}` / `{inactive}`, never says why). +9 → 20/20.
+- 2026-06-06 — `session.sx`: session-as-Erlang-process. create/lookup/touch/
+  explicit-expire/revoke as messages; idle-timeout self-expiry via
+  `receive ... after Ttl` notifying the owner then tombstoning. Tombstones
+  answer lookups with `{error, expired|revoked}` — never a silent dead
+  mailbox. Established the conformance harness (`conformance.sh`, scoreboard,
+  `tests/session.sx`). 11/11.
 
 ## Blockers
-(loop fills this in)
+- 2026-06-07 — **PKCE S256 blocked: erlang binary bugs.** Two substrate bugs
+  in `lib/erlang` make a correct/secure S256 impossible (S256 needs
+  `BASE64URL(SHA256(verifier))` compared against the stored challenge):
+  1. **Binary `=:=` always true.** `<<"v1">> =:= <<"v2">>` → `true`;
+     `<<"abc">> =:= <<"abd">>` → `true`. So a hash comparison can't reject a
+     wrong verifier.
+  2. **`crypto:hash` ignores binary-literal content.**
+     `crypto:hash(sha256, <<"v1">>)` and `crypto:hash(sha256, <<"v2">>)` return
+     the *identical* 32-byte digest (`6e 34 0b 9c …`), which is also ≠ the
+     correct SX-level `(crypto-sha256 "abc")` (`ba 78 16 bf …`). The binary
+     payload isn't reaching the hash. (Atom input → badarg→nil, separate issue.)
+  Minimal repro (epoch protocol, after loading lib/erlang/runtime.sx):
+  `(erlang-eval-ast "case <<\"a\">> =:= <<\"b\">> of true -> bug; false -> ok end")`
+  → `bug`. Not in scope to fix (lib/erlang is a substrate). PKCE `plain`
+  remains correct and in use; S256 deferred until the binary path is fixed.