clients.sx (RFC 6749 §2) — confidential clients must present the correct
secret at the token endpoint (wrong → invalid_client); public clients are
identified but not authenticated; redirect_uris are pre-registered and
checked by exact-match valid_redirect (§3.1.2.2 + Security BCP). Standalone
module for now; wiring confidential-client auth into oauth exchange is a
follow-up. New tests/clients.sx. 149/149.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The token registry holds a logical clock (advance/now; the substrate has no
wall clock). Grants carry a Ttl; each access token carries an Expires
(Now-at-issue + Ttl, or infinity); introspect returns inactive once Now
reaches it. Refresh mints a fresh short-lived access token — short access
tokens, long refresh tokens. issue/4 and issue_grant/4 default to infinity so
all prior behaviour is unchanged. New tests/expiry.sx. token loop/6. 138/138.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each access token now carries its own effective scope (<= the grant's max).
refresh/3 requests a narrower scope; the request must be a subset of the
grant scope, else {error, invalid_scope} and the refresh token is NOT
consumed (client may retry, §5.2). refresh/2 keeps full scope; scope stays
opaque (atom or list) for issue so all prior atom-scope tests are unchanged.
Also files a Blocker: PKCE S256 is blocked on erlang substrate bugs (binary
=:= always true; crypto:hash ignores binary content). token 24/24, 130/130.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
federation.sx — peer-asserted subjects, advisory and trust-gated. An
assertion is accepted only from an explicitly trusted peer (else
{error, untrusted}) and is flagged {peer_asserted, Peer}, never promoted to
local authority; acl decides what a peer-asserted identity may do. Cross-
instance subject mapping namespaces remote subjects by peer
({federated, Peer, Remote}) so two peers' "alice" never collide, with
optional explicit aliasing. Adds an audit-completeness test. New
tests/federation.sx. All four phases done — 124/124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
audit.sx is an append-only ledger process. token.sx gains start/1(Audit)
and emits an event on every grant transition (issue, refresh, revoke —
including reuse-triggered revoke); start/0 stays unaudited so existing use
is unchanged (token.sx has no compile-time dep on the audit module, it just
sends to a pid). The ledger answers (identity/audit subject) via
audit/actions/count/all, chronological. In-memory event stream; persist
backing is a later Erlang<->persist bridge, out of scope. 111/111.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
cache.sx — a process wrapping the token registry, memoising introspect.
Revocation stays real via generation invalidation: any revoke/refresh bumps
a generation counter, so every cached positive instantly becomes a miss and
re-validates against the live registry. A revoked token never reads valid
out of cache, not for a millisecond. stats() exposes hits/misses. New
tests/cache.sx. 101/101.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
membership.sx — coop membership as a guarded state machine
(none→pending→active→lapsed⇄active, any→revoked terminal); invalid
transitions return explicit {error, CurrentStatus}, never silent no-ops.
project(Subject, App) renders the one canonical state into a per-app claim
({member,Tier,App} / {pending,App} / {lapsed,App} / {denied,App} /
{non_member,App}) — identity reports what the membership is; acl decides
whether the app should honour it. New tests/membership.sx. 92/92.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
oauth.sx now owns a session registry. establish creates a subject session;
silent_authorize (OIDC prompt=none §3.1.2.1) asks "does this subject have a
live session?" — if yes it mints a code skipping consent, bound to client +
redirect_uri + PKCE exactly like a consented code; if no it returns
login_required (a negative state, not a login redirect). One session serves
many clients; end_session closes the fast-path. New tests/sso.sx. 75/75.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
exchange now issues an access+refresh pair (RFC 6749 §4.1.4/§5.1) via
token.sx issue_grant; added the refresh grant (§6) delegating to token
rotation. End-to-end: code-exchange → refresh → introspect (active),
refresh-token reuse rejected (invalid_grant), and revoke-then-refresh
blocked by grant cascade. oauth 17/17, 65/65.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The grant {Subject,Client,Scope,Status} becomes the unit of authorization
and cascade; access + refresh tokens reference it. issue_grant returns an
access+refresh pair; refresh (RFC 6749 §6) supersedes the presented refresh
token and mints a fresh pair; reusing a superseded refresh token is treated
as theft (RFC 6819 §5.2.2.3) and revokes the whole family, killing the live
descendant. revoke of any token cascades to the grant. All prior token
behaviour preserved. token 18/18, 62/62.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
identity:start() spawns one coordinator owning the token table + session
registry and exposes the whole-domain ops. The coordinator is the owner
sessions notify on idle timeout, so an expired session deregisters itself
— timeout-driven, never swept. verify/2 answers identity only ({active,
Subject, Client, Scope}); permission is delegated to acl. 39/39.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Directory process holding (SessionId, Subject, Client, Pid) rows. Answers
the SSO probe lookup(Subject, Client) and the fan-out sessions_for(Subject)
(one subject, many clients). Routes only — no grant state, decides nothing.
Integration-tested: register a live session, route to it, confirm active.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Token table is a process; the token is an opaque make_ref carrying no
information. introspect() is a live table lookup every time, so
revocation is real (RFC 7009 §2): a revoked token reads {inactive} on
the next introspection with no validity window. Reply shapes follow
RFC 7662 §2.2 ({active, Subject, Client, Scope} / {inactive}).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Session is an Erlang process holding {subject, client, status}. lookup/
touch/expire/revoke are messages; expiry is the process's own
`receive ... after Ttl` timeout (RFC-agnostic; no global sweep), which
notifies the owner and tombstones. Tombstoned sessions answer lookups
with an explicit {error, expired|revoked}, never a silent dead mailbox.
Adds the conformance harness + scoreboard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
