Reading lib/mod (Prolog) and lib/acl (Datalog) side by side shows the convergence
is in module names only. Federation: opposite trust models (SX registry + decision
sharing vs in-engine Datalog trust facts + fact replication), zero shared code.
Audit: only a ~5-fn core overlaps and it diverges (entry shapes, seq base 0 vs 1,
op sets, mutation idiom) — not worth a shared module under two restricted envs.
Outcome: keep them parallel; revisit only on a third same-model consumer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
identity_tokens:revoke_app(Subject, Client) revokes every grant a subject
holds for one client at once (audited one revoke per grant), exposed at the
facade as identity:revoke_app. The action counterpart to the grants view —
completing the account-security view+action pairs (sessions/logout_all,
grants/revoke_app, history). Other subjects' same-client grants are
untouched. account 11/11, 233/233.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
identity_tokens:grants_for(Subject) lists a subject's active grants as
[{Client, Scope}] (revoked excluded), exposed through the facade as
identity:grants(Subject). Completes the per-subject account-security trio:
sessions (where logged in), grants (which apps have access), history (what
happened). New tests/account.sx. Conformance internal timeout raised to
1200s (22 suites, ~10min — run in background). 229/229.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
register_dynamic generates a client_id + secret server-side and registers
the client, returning {ok, ClientId, Secret} — self-service onboarding
distinct from the manual register_client. A dynamic confidential client can
then use client_credentials; a dynamic public client stays
unauthorized_client. New tests/dynreg.sx. 222/222.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
push_authorization_request lodges the authorization params under a
single-use request_uri; authorize_pushed redeems it into the normal consent
flow. Pushed requests reuse the pending store ({pushed, Rec} keyed by the
request_uri ref — distinct from consent req_ids, so no collision and no new
loop state). The pushed binding (client + redirect + PKCE) is still enforced
at exchange. New tests/par.sx. 217/217.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
oauth.sx gains token_exchange(SubjectToken, RequestedScope): a valid access
token is downscoped into a NEW independent grant for the same subject
(subset only, else invalid_scope; inactive subject token → invalid_grant).
The exchanged token's lifecycle is independent of the subject token
(revoking either leaves the other active); exchanges chain. Least-privilege
handoff to downstream services. New tests/exchange.sx. 201/201.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
api.sx gains sessions(Subject) (enumerate a subject's live sessions) and
logout_all(Subject) ("log out everywhere") — revokes and deregisters every
session the subject holds, auditing a logout per session, leaving other
subjects' sessions untouched. Builds on registry.sessions_for. New
tests/session_mgmt.sx. 193/193.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
delegation.sx makes the loop's central rule concrete: check() introspects
the token first — inactive → {error, unauthenticated} (401), acl never
consulted — and only an authenticated subject's request is delegated to
acl, which returns permit/deny ({error, forbidden} = 403). 401 strictly
precedes 403. acl-on-sx (Datalog) is a different SX guest wired at the
integration layer, so the decider here is a labelled stub (permits when
Action in Scope); swap the pid and the boundary is unchanged. New
tests/delegation.sx. 185/185 — extensions backlog clear.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The identity coordinator now owns an audit ledger and a membership registry
alongside its token table (started with the ledger) and session registry.
login/logout are audited; new ops history/enroll/member_status/member_project
surface the audit and membership axes through the one `identity` door.
Identity proves who and reports membership; acl still decides permission.
Existing api behaviour unchanged. New tests/facade.sx. 177/177.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
device.sx — for input-constrained devices. authorize → {device_code,
user_code}; the human approves/denies out-of-band by user_code; the device
polls by device_code through the §3.5 status machine (authorization_pending
→ access_denied / {ok, Token}). Device code is single-use once a token
issues; approve-after-deny is rejected. Tokens grant-backed via token.sx.
Device-code expiry + slow_down deferred (no wall clock). New
tests/device.sx. 168/168.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
oauth.sx now owns a client registry (loop/6) with register_client and the
client_credentials grant. A confidential client authenticates and gets a
token acting on its own behalf (subject = the client), no refresh token
(§4.4.3). A public client is unauthorized_client; any auth failure (unknown
client or wrong secret) is invalid_client — no client-existence oracle
(§5.2). identity-load-oauth! now pulls its deps. New tests/grants.sx.
158/158.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
clients.sx (RFC 6749 §2) — confidential clients must present the correct
secret at the token endpoint (wrong → invalid_client); public clients are
identified but not authenticated; redirect_uris are pre-registered and
checked by exact-match valid_redirect (§3.1.2.2 + Security BCP). Standalone
module for now; wiring confidential-client auth into oauth exchange is a
follow-up. New tests/clients.sx. 149/149.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
