oauth.sx routes the PKCE check through pkce_ok: an S256 challenge carried as
{s256, Hash} compares crypto:hash(sha256, Verifier) =:= Hash; a bare
challenge stays plain (§4.1), so both methods coexist with no change to
existing flows (the bare path is the old =:= behaviour). Raw sha256 digests
are compared (base64url is wire encoding, omitted). New tests/pkce.sx (6,
incl. S256 through PAR). Verified pkce 6/6; substrate fix is in the
preceding commit. 239 total.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
register_dynamic generates a client_id + secret server-side and registers
the client, returning {ok, ClientId, Secret} — self-service onboarding
distinct from the manual register_client. A dynamic confidential client can
then use client_credentials; a dynamic public client stays
unauthorized_client. New tests/dynreg.sx. 222/222.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
push_authorization_request lodges the authorization params under a
single-use request_uri; authorize_pushed redeems it into the normal consent
flow. Pushed requests reuse the pending store ({pushed, Rec} keyed by the
request_uri ref — distinct from consent req_ids, so no collision and no new
loop state). The pushed binding (client + redirect + PKCE) is still enforced
at exchange. New tests/par.sx. 217/217.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
oauth.sx gains token_exchange(SubjectToken, RequestedScope): a valid access
token is downscoped into a NEW independent grant for the same subject
(subset only, else invalid_scope; inactive subject token → invalid_grant).
The exchanged token's lifecycle is independent of the subject token
(revoking either leaves the other active); exchanges chain. Least-privilege
handoff to downstream services. New tests/exchange.sx. 201/201.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
oauth.sx now owns a client registry (loop/6) with register_client and the
client_credentials grant. A confidential client authenticates and gets a
token acting on its own behalf (subject = the client), no refresh token
(§4.4.3). A public client is unauthorized_client; any auth failure (unknown
client or wrong secret) is invalid_client — no client-existence oracle
(§5.2). identity-load-oauth! now pulls its deps. New tests/grants.sx.
158/158.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
oauth.sx now owns a session registry. establish creates a subject session;
silent_authorize (OIDC prompt=none §3.1.2.1) asks "does this subject have a
live session?" — if yes it mints a code skipping consent, bound to client +
redirect_uri + PKCE exactly like a consented code; if no it returns
login_required (a negative state, not a login redirect). One session serves
many clients; end_session closes the fast-path. New tests/sso.sx. 75/75.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
exchange now issues an access+refresh pair (RFC 6749 §4.1.4/§5.1) via
token.sx issue_grant; added the refresh grant (§6) delegating to token
rotation. End-to-end: code-exchange → refresh → introspect (active),
refresh-token reuse rejected (invalid_grant), and revoke-then-refresh
blocked by grant cascade. oauth 17/17, 65/65.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
