;; lib/acl/engine.sx — ACL ruleset + decision reducer over lib/datalog/. ;; ;; The engine is a thin layer: it owns the permit ruleset (SX data rules) and ;; reduces a (subject, action, resource) decision to a Datalog query against a ;; db built from EDB facts. The rule engine itself is Datalog's. ;; ;; Policy — inheritance + federation with deny-overrides: ;; ;; eff_grant(S,A,R) :- grant(S,A,R). ; direct ;; eff_grant(S,A,R) :- member_of(S,G), eff_grant(G,A,R). ; group/role chain ;; eff_grant(S,A,R) :- child_of(R,P), eff_grant(S,A,P). ; resource tree ;; eff_grant(S,A,R) :- member_of(S,Role), role_grant(Role,A,R). ; role expansion ;; eff_grant(S,A,R) :- delegate(Peer,S,A,R), ; federated grant ;; trust(Peer,L), level_covers(L,A). ;; ;; eff_deny(S,A,R) :- deny(S,A,R). ; direct ;; eff_deny(S,A,R) :- member_of(S,G), eff_deny(G,A,R). ; group chain ;; eff_deny(S,A,R) :- child_of(R,P), eff_deny(S,A,P). ; resource tree ;; ;; permit(S,A,R) :- eff_grant(S,A,R), not eff_deny(S,A,R). ;; ;; DENY-OVERRIDES: an effective deny anywhere in the inheritance closure of ;; (S,A,R) defeats any effective grant — including federated grants. Deny ;; inherits through the *same* group and resource chains as grant, so a ;; group-level or ancestor-resource deny is authoritative for members/ ;; descendants. This is the principled, fail-safe reading of "deny wins". ;; ;; FEDERATION — non-transitive trust: a peer's `delegate` fact only grants if a ;; *local* `trust(Peer, L)` exists AND that level `level_covers` the action. ;; Trust is re-checked on every query (it is a body literal), never baked in at ;; fact-ingestion time, so revoking trust or narrowing a level takes effect ;; immediately on the next decision. ;; ;; Termination & stratification: ;; - eff_grant/eff_deny recurse only over member_of and child_of, which are ;; EDB relations with no function symbols, so the closure is finite (cyclic ;; membership/containment just reaches a fixpoint, never loops). The ;; federation rule is non-recursive. ;; - permit negates eff_deny; neither eff_grant nor eff_deny depends on ;; permit, so the program is stratifiable (permit sits in a higher stratum). (define acl-rules (quote ((eff_grant S A R <- (grant S A R)) (eff_grant S A R <- (member_of S G) (eff_grant G A R)) (eff_grant S A R <- (child_of R P) (eff_grant S A P)) (eff_grant S A R <- (member_of S Role) (role_grant Role A R)) (eff_grant S A R <- (delegate Peer S A R) (trust Peer L) (level_covers L A)) (eff_deny S A R <- (deny S A R)) (eff_deny S A R <- (member_of S G) (eff_deny G A R)) (eff_deny S A R <- (child_of R P) (eff_deny S A P)) (permit S A R <- (eff_grant S A R) {:neg (eff_deny S A R)})))) ;; Build a Datalog db from a list of EDB facts under the ACL ruleset. (define acl-build-db (fn (facts) (dl-program-data facts acl-rules))) ;; Core decision: does the db permit subject S to perform action A on ;; resource R? Reduces to a ground Datalog query on the derived `permit` ;; relation — non-empty result means permitted. (define acl-permit? (fn (db subj act res) (> (len (dl-query db (list (quote permit) subj act res))) 0)))