# mod-on-sx: Moderation on Prolog rose-ash needs moderation infrastructure: reports flagged by users, automated classifications (spam, abuse), tiered escalation (auto → human → appeal), audit trails. Each decision is the conclusion of a backtracking search over evidence and policy rules — exactly what Prolog does. Where acl-sx says "may this happen?", mod-sx says "should this stay?" The former is a positive decision (proof of grant); the latter often a negative one (proof of violation), and policy chains naturally backtrack: if the first rule doesn't apply, try the next. End-state: a Prolog-on-SX layer for moderation policy declaration and evaluation, with persistent report lifecycle, audit log, escalation state machine, and federation extension. ## Status (rolling) `bash lib/mod/conformance.sh` → **176/176** (roadmap + 4 extensions complete) ## Ground rules - **Scope:** only touch `lib/mod/**` and `plans/mod-on-sx.md`. Do **not** edit `spec/`, `hosts/`, `shared/`, `lib/prolog/**`, or other `lib//`. You may **import** from `lib/prolog/` (public API in `lib/prolog/prolog.sx`); do **not** modify Prolog. - **Shared-file issues** go under "Blockers" with a minimal repro; do not fix here. - **SX files:** use `sx-tree` MCP tools only. - **Architecture:** policies are Prolog rules over `report(...)` and `evidence(...)` facts. Decisions are query results. Proof trees become audit records. The state machine for report lifecycle is separate (an SX module on top). - **Shared with acl-sx:** rule-engine plumbing may be liftable into `lib/guest/`. Watch for it; flag in Progress log but do not extract until both subsystems are past Phase 2. - **Commits:** one feature per commit. Keep Progress log updated and tick boxes. ## Architecture sketch ``` Report Decision {:by :about :reason :at} {:action :proof :next-state} │ ▲ ▼ │ lib/mod/schema.sx lib/mod/engine.sx — report/4, evidence/2, — query Prolog with report fact classification/3 predicates — extract proof tree │ ▲ ▼ │ lib/mod/policy.sx lib/mod/lifecycle.sx — rule syntax → Prolog — state machine — action heads: — open → triaged → decided {:keep :hide :remove — appeal handling :escalate :ban} │ │ ▼ ▼ lib/mod/audit.sx lib/mod/api.sx — append-only decision log — (mod/report ...) — proof tree persistence — (mod/decide report) — query API — (mod/appeal id) │ ▼ lib/mod/fed.sx — cross-instance reports via fed-sx — decision sharing / trust model ``` ## Phase 1 — Report representation + simple policy - [x] `lib/mod/schema.sx` — `report(id, by, about)`, `classification(id, kind)`, `report_count(subject, n)` Prolog facts; keyword classifier derives evidence - [x] `lib/mod/policy.sx` — `mod/mk-rule` + ordered `mod/default-rules`; conditions (`:classification`, `:count-at-least`) compile to Prolog goals; `policy_action/3` clauses, last clause `true` so every report yields at least `:keep` - [x] `lib/mod/engine.sx` — `(mod/decide-report r reports rules)` queries `policy_action(Id, Action, Rule)` with `pl-query-one` (clause order = precedence); returns a decision dict `{:action :rule :report-id :proof}` carrying the why - [x] `lib/mod/api.sx` — registry + `(mod/report by about reason)`, `(mod/decide id)` - [x] `lib/mod/tests/decide.sx` — 31 cases: spam/abuse keyword, repeated→escalate, no-rule→keep, precedence (spam beats repeated), proof shape, registry ids - [x] `lib/mod/scoreboard.{json,md}` - [x] `lib/mod/conformance.sh` ## Phase 2 — Evidence + audit trail - [x] evidence accumulation — `report :evidence` list; `mod/attach-evidence` + api `mod/add-evidence`; asserted as `evidence(Id, 'kind', 'val')` facts; new `:evidence` condition + `reviewer-remove` rule consume it - [x] proof tree from Prolog derivation — `mod/proof-goals` re-queries each body goal (id bound) against the same DB, recording goal text, solved?, and the bindings that satisfied it (e.g. count goal yields N=3, S=subject) - [x] `lib/mod/audit.sx` — append-only log: monotonic `:seq`, decision + proof + evidence snapshot; never mutates prior entries - [x] `(mod/audit id)` retrieval (+ `mod/audit-latest`, `mod/audit-all`, count) - [x] `lib/mod/tests/audit.sx` — 29 cases: proof goal text/bindings, evidence-driven decisions, append-only ordering, per-report retrieval, snapshot-at-decision-time ## Phase 3 — Escalation + lifecycle state machine - [x] state machine: `lib/mod/lifecycle.sx` — `:open → :triaged → :decided → :appealed → :final` as a pure SX module over the engine; transition table guards illegal moves (sets `:error`, leaves state); immutable cases with `:history` - [x] auto-tier: `mod/case-triage` runs the engine; terminal action (hide/remove/ keep) → tier `auto`, `mod/case-resolve` advances to `:decided` - [x] human-tier: `:escalate` action → tier `human`; `mod/case-resolve` is blocked (sets `:error`); `mod/case-review` attaches evidence, re-decides, advances - [x] appeal: `mod/case-appeal` attaches appeal evidence + re-runs the engine; new `exonerated-keep` rule (top precedence) lets exoneration override a prior `:hide` - [x] `(mod/appeal id new-evidence)` API — lifecycle façade over a case registry in api.sx (`mod/triage` / `resolve` / `review` / `appeal` / `finalize`), logging each committed decision to the audit trail - [x] `lib/mod/tests/escalation.sx` — 46 cases: transition guards, auto/human tiers, blocked resolve, full appeal-override traversal, history, api façade ## Phase 4 — Federation - [x] cross-instance reports — `mod/fed-receive-report peer …` ingests a peer's report into the local registry, tagging origin; `mod/report-origin` resolves it (local reports default to `"local"`); the engine decides federated reports unchanged - [x] decision sharing — `mod/fed-share-decision decision peers` pushes messages to the mock outbox (`mod/fed-send!` is the seam the real fed-sx transport replaces) - [x] trust model — `mod/fed-receive-decision` applies a peer's decision locally ONLY when `(mod/trusted? peer :mod)`; otherwise it lands in the advisory log, unapplied. `mod/grant-trust` / `mod/revoke-trust` manage the trust registry - [x] revocation — `mod/fed-revoke!` marks the applied action revoked + emits a revocation message to the origin; `mod/fed-revoke-if-invalidated` re-runs the engine and revokes only when the action no longer holds (proof invalidated) - [x] `lib/mod/tests/fed.sx` — 26 cases: trust grant/scope/revoke, cross-instance ingest + origin, outbox sharing, advisory-vs-trusted apply, revocation + invalidation (exoneration flips hide→keep → revoked) ## Extensions (post-roadmap) - [x] **Ext 1 — negation-as-failure** (`lib/mod/tests/extensions.sx`, +14). Report `:attrs`; policy conditions `(:attr "x")` → `attr(Id, x)` and `(:not )` → `not()` (the Prolog supports `not/1` and `\+/1` as *functors*, not the prefix `\+` operator). Closed-world example: "hide spam UNLESS author verified". Default policy untouched — demonstrated via custom rule sets, so all 132 base tests stay green. - [x] **Ext 2 — weighted/aggregate scoring** (+8). Report `:signals` ({:kind :weight}) project to `signal(Id, 'kind', weight)` facts; condition `(:score-at-least N)` → `aggregate_all(sum(W), signal(Id, _, W), T), T >= N`. Many weak signals accumulate past a threshold — genuine Prolog arithmetic aggregation. Default policy untouched. - [x] **Ext 3 — proof explanation** (`lib/mod/explain.sx`, +10). `mod/explain` renders a decision into a readable "why": action + rule, evidence line, and the derivation goal-by-goal with `[proved]`/`[unproved]` marks and unification bindings. E.g. `Report rc: escalate (rule: repeated-escalate)` … `[proved] report(rc, B, S), report_count(S, N), N >= 3 {B=ann, N=3, S=dave}`. - [x] **Ext 4 — report linking / dedup** (`lib/mod/link.sx`, +12). `mod/related-ids` and `mod/reporters-of` find reports about a subject via a Prolog relational query (`report(Id, _, 'subject')`) — the policy substrate reused for retrieval. `mod/dedup-reports` collapses identical reports (reporter|subject|reason key, case-insensitive); `mod/distinct-reporters-of` counts unique reporters. ## Progress log - **Ext 4 — report linking / dedup, 176/176** (+12). Relational retrieval (`related-ids`, `reporters-of`) reuses the Prolog substrate for *querying* report clusters, not just deciding them — `report(Id, _, 'subject')` by unification. Dedup is pure SX over a normalized link key. Own suite (`tests/link.sx`) — going forward, new extensions get their own test file rather than growing `extensions.sx`. With roadmap + 4 extensions the subsystem now spans schema → policy DSL (6 condition types) → engine + proofs → audit → lifecycle → federation → explanation → linking, all on the green `lib/prolog` substrate. - **Ext 3 — proof explanation, 164/164** (+10). `mod/explain` turns the Phase-2 proof tree into human-readable text — the audit trail's "why" made legible. Pure SX over existing decision data; no engine change. Renders unification bindings inline (`{B=ann, N=3, S=dave}`) so a moderator sees exactly which facts proved the decision. - **Ext 2 — weighted/aggregate scoring, 154/154** (+8). `:signals` + the `(:score-at-least N)` condition push aggregation into Prolog (`aggregate_all(sum(W), …)`), so low-confidence signals can accumulate to a takedown. The schema's report-rebuild helpers (`report*` / `with-*`) now thread six fields; each addition stays non-breaking because empty collections project to empty fact blocks. Default policy and its 132 tests untouched (proven via custom rule sets). - **Ext 1 — negation-as-failure, 146/146** (+14). `:attr` and `:not` conditions give the policy closed-world reasoning. The substrate's negation is a functor (`not(Goal)`), not the ISO prefix `\+` operator (that doesn't parse here) — noted for any future negation work. Kept the default rule set and its 132 tests untouched by proving the feature through custom rule sets instead. - **Phase 4 complete — 132/132** (+26 fed). **Full roadmap done.** Federation: cross-instance reports, decision sharing, advisory-by-default trust, revocation. fed-sx is mocked behind `mod/fed-send!` (in-memory outbox) — the only seam a real transport must replace. The hard rule is enforced: a peer's decision binds locally only under `(mod/trusted? peer :mod)`; otherwise it is recorded as a suggestion and never auto-applied. Revocation composes with the proof model from Phase 2 — `mod/fed-revoke-if-invalidated` re-runs the *same* engine and undoes a moderation only when the action it once proved no longer holds (an exoneration evidence flips hide→keep, triggering revocation + an origin-bound revocation message). - **Liftable (acl-sx watch):** the trust registry (`grant`/`revoke`/`trusted?` over `{:peer :scope}`) and the outbox/send! seam are generic federation plumbing; candidates for `lib/guest/` if acl-sx grows a federation phase. - **Phase 3 complete — 106/106** (+46 escalation). Lifecycle state machine, auto/human tiers, appeal-override, and an api façade. The state machine is a pure SX module (`lib/mod/lifecycle.sx`) over the engine — policy stays in Prolog, lifecycle stays out of it, per the design constraint. Cases are immutable values threaded through transitions; illegal moves set `:error` rather than throwing (the env's error handling is untested, so this keeps tests deterministic). Tier logic: triage runs the engine, an `:escalate` action parks the case at the human tier where `mod/case-resolve` is blocked until `mod/case-review` supplies evidence. Appeal-override works because the new `exonerated-keep` rule sits at top precedence — appeal evidence re-runs the same engine and a higher-precedence clause wins. The api façade (`mod/triage` … `mod/finalize`) keeps a per-report case registry and logs each committed decision to the Phase-2 audit trail, so lifecycle + audit compose. - **Gotcha:** `sx_insert_near` inserts only the FIRST top-level form of a multi-form source — silently drops the rest (byte count barely changes). For multi-form additions, rewrite the file with `sx_write_file`. - **Phase 2 complete — 60/60** (+29 audit). Evidence accumulation, constructive proof trees, append-only audit log. A decision's `:proof :goals` is a real derivation: each body goal is re-queried against the same Prolog DB with the report id bound, so the count rule's proof carries `N=3, S=` straight from unification — not a reconstruction. Evidence is asserted as `evidence(Id, 'kind', 'val')`; the new `reviewer-remove` rule (placed first = highest precedence) lets human review override automated classification. `mod/decide` now commits each decision to the audit log with the evidence snapshot in force at decision time. Unknown predicates in this Prolog fail gracefully (verified) — so an evidence-less report safely falls through the reviewer rule without an existence error. - **Liftable (acl-sx watch):** the proof-tree builder (`mod/proof-goals` — re-query-each-goal) and the append-only log shape are both generic. Both subsystems are now past Phase 2; next time either touches plumbing, evaluate lifting `proof-goals` + the audit-log primitives into `lib/guest/`. - **Phase 1 complete — 31/31.** Report schema, keyword classifier, policy DSL, engine, registry api, conformance harness. Decisions are proofs: each carries `:rule` (matching clause), `:proof {:rule :conditions :evidence :count}`. Precedence is Prolog clause order resolved by `pl-query-one`; a trailing `true`-bodied default rule makes "no rule matched" a real `:keep`, not a query failure. Evidence (spam/abuse classification) derived in SX and asserted as `classification/2` facts; repeated-report escalation uses a genuine Prolog join + arithmetic (`report(Id,_,S), report_count(S,N), N >= 3`). - **Gotcha (env):** loading the prolog libs strips `includes?` (and other high-level string prims) from the eval env — only the set the prolog tokenizer itself uses survives (`slice`, `len`, `nth`, `=`, `join`, `downcase`, `map`, `reduce`, `append!`). Implemented `mod/str-contains?` over `slice`/`len` rather than relying on `includes?`. Watch for this in later phases — stick to the blessed primitive set. - **Liftable (acl-sx watch):** `mod/join-with`, `mod/str-contains?`, `mod/any?`, and the rule→clause compilation shape are generic rule-engine plumbing. Do not extract to `lib/guest/` until both mod-sx and acl-sx are past Phase 2. ## Blockers (none)